Reinventing tank waste remediation system project management

David S. Kelly and Craig Kuhlman

The “reinventing government” effort is being vigorously pursued at the Hanford Nuclear Site in southeastern Washington State. The once top-secret reservation was established in the early 1940s to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons (see sidebar, “Background of the Hanford Site”). An enormous amount of radioactive and hazardous chemical waste was created during production and the Hanford Site stores two-thirds of the waste created during the nation's nuclear defense program. Under the direction of the U.S. Department of Energy's Richland Operations Office, a team of contractors led by Westinghouse Hanford Company is cleaning up the site. The project presents vast technological, project management, and safety challenges.

The Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) was established in 1991 to ensure the safe storage, treatment, and preparation for disposal of radioactive tank waste at the Hanford Site. This project approach grouped related functions into one organization with a focused mission of waste storage and preparation for disposal. The TWRS clean-up mission will take more than 30 years to complete. Westinghouse Hanford Company is the contractor leading this program. Teamed with ICF Kaiser Hanford Company, Boeing Computer Services, Richland, Inc. (BCSR), and Battelle/Pacific Northwest Laboratory, activities are under way to resolve the complex tank waste issues.

Essential Technologies: Technical Challenges of Clean-Up

Hanford's 216,000 m3 (57 Mgal) of radioactive high-level waste is stored in 149 single-shell, and 28 double-shell carbon steel-lined concrete tanks. These tanks were constructed in groups of three to 18 “tank farms.” Most of the tanks have a capacity of 3,800 m3 (1M gal) each. They are filled with radioactively contaminated caustic liquids, sludges, slurries, and salt-cakes. Various plutonium and uranium irradiated fuel recovery processes, waste radionuclide recovery processes, and laboratory and reactor decontamination solutions contributed to this inventory [11]. The waste has been stored in a highly caustic (high pH) form to minimize corrosion to the mild steel tanks. (The shortage of stainless steel during World War II led to the choice to use carbon steel in tank construction and the need to neutralize the waste.) Over the years, the contents have been concentrated and mixed to maximize tank space available for storage. This was also done to provide space in the doubleshell tanks as liquid was transferred from older single-shell tanks of questionable integrity, and to minimize the need for new tank construction.

Safety Emphasis. Employee, public, and environmental safety is an important concern for TWRS. The high-level wastes had been stored in single-shell carbon steel lined concrete tanks; at least 67 of those tanks are known or believed to have leaked. Newer tank designs use double-shell containment to increase safety. No waste has been added to the single-shell tanks since 1980. And the effort is continuing to remove the pumpable liquids from these older tanks after which only residual saltcake and sludge remain.

Safety issues in certain tanks created by Craig Kuhlman the chemical composition of the waste and the potential for reaction under certain conditions contribute significantly to the challenges of safe management of the tank farms. One recent concern involved a condition in which hydrogen gas is generated and trapped in the thick sludge. The pressure builds and the gas literally “burps” its way up through the tank waste, causing a rapid turnover of the contents. The hydrogen released in such an event can be in potentially flammable concentrations. The presence of a spark could theoretically cause a fire that could harm the integrity of the tank. To mitigate the issue at the tank that caused the largest concern (101-SY), a giant mixing pump has been installed to provide for the controlled release of gases in safe concentrations, far below their lower limit of flammability. As many as five other doubleshell tanks at Hanford could receive flammable gas mitigation by this method.

Background of the Hanford Site

Back in December 2, 1942, the people living in rural little Hanford, Washington, didn't know how their lives were about to change. That was the day the first controlled chain reaction occurred in a small research reactor in Chicago. In less than a month, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers would establish Manhattan Engineering District on 1657.6 km2 (640 square miles) of nearby land along the banks of the great Columbia River. By August 1943, the natives had their land “bought up” by the government, and 51,000 on-site workers living in a construction camp took their place. At the time, the Hanford Construction Camp was the fourth largest city in Washington State [4]. At peak periods, as many as 94,000 men and women were involved in the project.

The Allies fighting Germany and Japan in World War II needed this massive construction effort to produce plutonium for use in military weapons. The Hanford Engineering Works was part of a series of government installations strategically placed around the country, all of which had a specific role in the atomic weapons production process. In an unprecedented show of American resolve, the site successfully built the nation's first production reactors and processing plants, which supplied the plutonium for the atomic bombs that ended World War II.

Amazingly, less than 18 months after breaking ground, the first three reactors went into operation. The first plutonium was available four months later. Over 596,353 m3 (780,000 cubic yards) of concrete and 36,287 metric tons (40,000 tons) of structural steel were placed. To get this work done, 621 km (386 miles) of road, and 254 km (158 miles) of railroad were constructed [4].

Secrecy was so important that husbands couldn't tell their wives what they were working on. In fact, very few of the workers were allowed to know how their part of the work fit into what they were building. Everything was on a “need to know” basis. Most speculated that it had something to do with explosives, since it was in support of the war effort. The thick concrete walls, required for shielding the radioactive rays, fooled workers into believing the explosive plant story. It wasn't until the day the second atomic bomb, called “Fat Man,” was dropped on Japan that the workers and families learned of the actual role Hanford played in the war effort [4].

From that time to the present, Hanford played various roles in national defense, Cold War plutonium production, energy, research, and finally environmental clean-up. In its current role, Hanford is an important laboratory for developing new technologies and adapting others essential to resolve not only the radioactive tank waste disposal issues, but also those of similar sites across the U.S. Department of Energy complex and around the world. It is possible that these technologies can be applied to resolve non-radioactive hazardous waste problems around the world as well.

Tank Waste Disposal. The TWRS team is moving forward with tank waste disposal through the following steps:

  • Characterizing the tank waste
  • Retrieving it from the storage tanks
  • Separating the tank waste into highlevel and low-level fractions
  • Reducing the high-level waste stream volume so the immobilized volume is acceptable
  • Immobilizing the tank waste by using vitrification technology.

Characterization. Characterizing the high-level waste is compounded by its hazardous nature. Strategies for safely handling the tank waste are being developed based on the characterization results. Characterization techniques must ensure representative samples are taken, while maintaining the safety of the workers, the public, and the environment.

Retrieval. Waste retrieval is necessary due to the age of the tanks and associated equipment. While most of the liquid has been removed from the single-shell tanks, these tanks have a limited life. Since the waste exists in liquid, sludge, slurry, and saltcake forms, retrieval is a challenge. Several proven and theoretical methods are being proposed. Hydraulic sluicing, a proven method, is an added hazard in the single-shell tanks because of the potential for new leaks and additional insult to the environment. Mechanical retrieval methods, such as robotic arms, hold promise, but the high radioactivity creates added challenges. Whatever method is used, the management of the new waste created during retrieval must be considered. Sluicing liquids can be evaporated to reduce volumes. Solid waste from leftover equipment, contaminated soil, etc., will present its own disposal problems.

Pretreatment. The TWRS pretreatment strategy maximizes the concentration of radionuclides in the high-level waste fraction, while minimizing the volume. Both proven and prototype technologies are being researched. These include leaching, alkaline sludge washing, or dissolving the tank waste in nitric acids. However, it is hoped nitric acid dissolution won't be needed due to its special corrosion concerns and the fact that it would create a relatively large volume of low-level waste. Depending on the amount of pretreatment, the low-level waste would contain a relatively small percentage of radionuclides, but would be of a much larger volume of chemicals than highlevel waste. The separations strategy is driven by disposal requirements, and pretreatment will result in a relatively smaller volume of high-level waste to be immobilized.

image

The Hanford Site's Plutonium-Uranium Extraction plant known as PUREX, with six double-shell waste tanks of the AW tank farm under construction. PUREX shows how waste tanks were constructed near chemical processing plants at Hanford during the World War II and Cold War years. Irradiated fuel was transported to chemical separations plants, where solvent extraction processes recovered plutonium and uranium for U.S. nuclear defense programs, while the radioactive wastes were left in tank storage.

Waste Immobilization. Tank waste immobilization will be by two separate vitrification processes, turning the waste into glass. The current strategy calls for the high-level waste to be melted in giant ceramic melters. This process will vitrify up to 15 metric tons (16.75 tons) per day of tank waste as borosilicate glass logs that will be poured into stainless steel containers and placed in on-site interim storage until they can be shipped to an off-site deep geological repository. The immobilization strategy is complicated by evolving repository waste acceptance criteria.

The low-level waste will be vitrified at a rate of up to 100 metric tons (111 tons) a day into 570,000 metric tons (628,317 tons) of glass. Some of the technology may be borrowed from the commercial glass industry if the equipment can be used and maintained under radioactive conditions. The need for remote maintenance is dictated by Hanford's goal to keep the risk to employees “As Low as Reasonably Achievable” (ALARA). The more successful the waste pretreatment, the less shielding and modification will be required for using existing melter technologies and equipment.

Managerial Challenges: Constantly Changing Project Management Roles

Managing the TWRS effort is a tremendous challenge. The Hanford Site is unique in many respects from the rest of the DOE defense complex, and constant change is an accurate reflection of the project management role. Managing the project through the culture, constraints and requirements is intriguing. Balancing the strategies and methods for addressing complex documentation requirements, government funding cycles, oversight groups, government requirements, and legally binding schedule commitments while ensuring progress is a mammoth undertaking. Hanford has some of the most skilled individuals in the world accepting the mission and meeting its challenges.

A complex project management culture has evolved during Hanford's first 50 years. Various agencies and contractors have operated the site, which has led to detailed reporting and approval cycles. The congressional funding cycle and DOE requirements make rapid changes in strategy difficult. Many government and non-government oversight groups keep a constant eye on Hanford's activities, some contributing to meaningful change and others complicating the process. To focus the clean-up effort, and as a pathway to achieve hazardous waste regulatory compliance, there is a formal agreement known as the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) [9]. To violate this agreement can result in substantial penalties (see sidebar, “Tri-Party Agreement Significance”).

TWRS’ strongest challenge is balancing the scope, schedule, and costs of this complicated and technologically challenging project. TWRS must establish the right mix of scope and schedule to keep the cost within federal budget constraints. And there is strong competition for funding dollars.

The public has a voice in the decisions to be made by TWRS. Public involvement has increased the complexity of the decisions. To provide a clear reflection of public values regarding Hanford's future, the Hanford Future Site Users Group was formed in 1992 [13]. This group was made up of a wide variety of governmental, business, agricultural, public, Native American and environmental interests. It was chartered to examine the range of possible future uses for the land at Hanford, and to identify appropriate environmental restoration scenarios that would make those uses possible.

Possible future uses of Hanford include agricultural, industrial, and commercial development; wildlife and habitat preserves; environmental restoration and waste management activities; public access and recreation; and Native American uses such as hunting, gathering, and religious practices. This last use is significant, as the entire Hanford Site is within the boundaries of the lands ceded by the Native American tribes by treaties signed in 1855, which reserve specific rights to the tribes [13]. The Users Group made nine major Hanford clean-up recommendations:

  • Protect the Columbia River from contamination.
  • Deal realistically and forcefully with groundwater contamination.
  • Use the Central Plateau wisely for waste management (this is the site where most TWRS activities will occur).
  • Do no human health, public safety, or environmental harm during clean-up or new development.
  • Clean-up of areas of high future use value is important.
  • Clean to the level necessary to enable the future use options to occur.
  • Transport waste safely and be prepared (Transportation Routing, Emergency Preparedness and Response).
  • Capture economic development opportunities locally.
  • Involve the public in future decisions about Hanford.

History of the TWRS Program

The tank waste disposal strategy at Hanford has taken 15 years to evolve. Emerging technologies, Cold War priorities, stakeholder involvement, funding issues, and politics all contributed to this evolution. Management of the tank wastes for the first 40 years of Hanford was a technical concern, not a considered priority. And until 1991 there was no consolidated organization accountable for resolving the issues that by then surrounded Hanford's 177 underground tanks, which presently contain 216,000 m3 (57 million gallons) of waste. In that year the Tank Waste Remediation System was established by the U.S. Department of Energy to safely manage and immobilize these wastes in anticipation of permanent disposal of the high-level waste fraction in a geologic repository. Since 1991, progress has been made in resolving waste tank safety issues, upgrading Tank Farm facilities and operations, and developing a new strategy for retrieving, treating, and immobilizing the waste for disposal.

The Tank Waste Remediation System is an organizational structure necessary to ensure complete waste management at Hanford. Its purpose is “to store, treat, and immobilize highly radioactive Hanford Site waste in an environmentally sound, safe, and cost-effective manner.”

During the past two years an extensive reevaluation was conducted of the waste treatment and disposal plan established from 1987 to 1989. Among other reasons, this reevaluation was needed because of:

  • The need to identify the tank waste safety issues to be resolved
  • The rejection of an existing facility (B Plant) for conversion to a waste pre-treatment facility
  • A decision by the DOE to retrieve waste from all singleshell tanks, which caused a fourfold increase in the volume of waste to be treated
  • Concerns about the long-term adequacy of grout as the waste form for disposing of low-level waste.

On January 25, 1994, representatives of the U.S. Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Washington State Department of Ecology signed a new Hanford Federal Facilities Agreement and Consent Order, or Tri-Party Agreement. This established enforceable milestones for specific clean-up actions. This new document succeeds the original Tri-Party Agreement, signed in 1989, and encompasses the “big picture” in the extraordinarily complex challenge of the safe storage, treatment and disposal of Hanford's tank wastes. It also represents a milestone in that it marks a major event in Hanford's clean-up, where true public involvement was an integral part in the decision making process. For TWRS, congressional funding constraints notwithstanding, the new Tri-Party Agreement extends the tank waste clean-up and disposal by ten years, to 2028. It includes the treatment and disposal of the waste in not only the 28 double-shell tanks, as limited by the original agreement, but in the 149 single-shell tanks and in the strontium and cesium capsules that are stored on the Hanford Site as well.

The DOE and its operating contractors are undergoing a type of corporate-quality culture change. Just as private industry has moved to more lean and quality-oriented organizations, so is TWRS. The change is maturing through different quality approaches, with the present strategy focused on smaller, more projectized organizations. The objective is for each project to have complete control over the resources it needs in order to succeed.

Tri-Party Agreement Significance

In a precedent-setting event, the Hanford Site became legally bound to meet set waste clean-up milestones when the DOE entered into the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) on May 15, 1989 [9]. The agreement established milestones and a schedule for clean-up, restoration, and hazardous waste regulatory compliance of the Hanford Site over a 30-year period. The agreement between DOE, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) is now in its fourth revision (approved on January 25, 1994). It provides prioritization of the clean-up effort and ensures commitment by the DOE to request continued funding for the clean-up effort. In the process, it opened the age of public involvement at Hanford. For a site that had been behind a shroud of secrecy for decades, consideration of public values in the decision making process and accountability to the public was a significant change.

The Tri-Party Agreement ensures the environmental impacts associated with past and present activities are thoroughly investigated and appropriate response actions are taken. It provides a framework for permitting, investigation of spills, and avoidance of litigation of Treatment Storage and Disposal Units (TSD) on site. It also ensures response action prioritization and compliance with applicable regulatory requirements, such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), Washington Hazardous Waste Management Act (HWMA), Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), and the National Contingency Plan (NCP), Super-fund Guidance and Policy [9]. The agreement has driven a much-needed reduction in the discharge of liquids to the soil. This was accomplished through capital upgrades and/or replacements for existing liquid effluent discharge systems.

Due to the need for integrated management between multiple contractors directing and supporting TWRS, very complex interface coordination has been required. A result has been some confusion over roles and responsibilities. Part of the project “team” concept is to define scope early and to create agreements and expectations up-front on roles and responsibilities. This has achieved some success in eliminating confusion and minimizing potential redundancy.

Solutions: Finding Opportunity in Constant Change

The success of any multi-project program, including TWRS, is due to the dedication of the people. With the increased complexity and challenges, the desire to succeed must remain strong. This desire is motivated by management focus and goals, and the flexibility to facilitate change. This flexibility can manifest itself in many ways.

At TWRS, cross-functional teams examine processes and recommend change. This allows identification of successful strategies and new ideas to solve problems. There have been tank farm “administrative holds” to address safety concerns, DOE reinventing government “stand-downs” to brainstorm better ways of doing business, and reassignment of the on-site engineer constructor contract to the operating contractor.

Safety is of paramount importance on the Hanford Site. Safety is more important than production and cost. TWRS has taken pauses in production to capture an opportunity to collectively improve its safety performance. The Hanford Site has held mandatory sitewide worker training and improvement workshops. The result is a strong safety ethic and a strong desire to “do it right the first time.” Employees say their safety awareness in the workplace has also influenced their private lives. A major TWRS challenge is to maintain such a strong safety culture without limiting productivity.

During the past year, the Hanford on-site engineering contract with the DOE's Richland Operations Office was reassigned to the Operating Contractor—Westinghouse Hanford Company. During the process, much of the infrastructure functions on site were transferred to the engineer constructor. This action provided the operating contractor opportunity to focus on technically complex program areas, such as the tank safety and waste disposal issues. Organizational functions had clear goals to pursue, with less redundancy between the companies. There has been renewed cooperation that is streamlining processes and improving trust. And there has been increased consensus on strategies and procedures that would have been unthinkable before. The outcome has been a more focused and cooperative overall composite organization and clearly demonstrates that Hanford's consolidation and projectization efforts do facilitate getting work done in a more consistent and cost-effective manner.

The consolidation has enabled project composite teams to be more effective. A TWRS goal in construction projects, for example, is to establish project managers for each effort and to allow them to negotiate resources from each company based on skills needed, not company affiliation. This, combined with co-location on the larger projects, has greatly improved team cohesiveness and results. The concept of composite teams has been applied to inter-contractor workshops on resolving some of the more difficult problems. This involves using a facilitated team building tool, such as Value Engineering, which identifies how to perform the essential functions of a process at the lowest possible cost. By using these facilitated methods, teams are solving problems and spending less time on “turf” issues.

Risk Versus Productivity— Choosing the Correct Project Management Style

David S. Kelly and Richard W. Foley

Work in a high-risk environment requires significant attention to the safety of workers, the public and the environment. At the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, safety is of the highest priority. Safety is behavior-based, it is a culture. Each employee is responsible for the safety of himself or herself and their co-workers. There is little tolerance for errors in safety performance. At Hanford, employees and management believe “zero tolerance” for safety infractions is achievable. It is this elevated standard of safety consciousness at Hanford that drives the necessity for special considerations in selecting the method for performing construction projects.

Driven by DOE's plan to control spending, to manage Hanford cost-effectively and to limit the growth of the resident workforce, the current contracting focus is to send more work to off-site firms. While these firms may recognize the elevated safety culture at Hanford they may not be immediately familiar with what is and what is not an acceptable standard of safety performance at the site. Work that may present little or no risk to employees, the public and the environment when performed off-site may present considerable risk when performed in a nuclear and hazardous waste environment. Much progress is being made in acclimating the new, off-site contractors to work at Hanford through close interaction during the early stages of a project, and very explicit contract language. The objective is to clearly define what is expected up-front and to select the correct project management strategy for the level of risk and safety performance.

The demand for exemplary safety performance with minimal risk requires challenging contracting strategies. The objective is to cost effectively achieve maximum production but with minimum risk to employees, the public, and the environment. While minimum or zero-risk safety performance seems like a logical goal, if carried to the extreme it can totally impede normal clean-up progress.

At Hanford, this is being addressed through a graded approach. For projects that present a greater risk, due to technical complexity or physical conditions, more Hanford-traditional project management is applied. This involves very tight baseline change control with minimum delegation of decision authority. For projects with moderate or normal public risk, a pilot program is being tested that puts more responsibility on the Architect Engineer (AE). This philosophy is a large step for the government arena. It involves forming an early partnership between the governmental customer and the off-site AE. This partnership helps the Architect Engineer assist the owner in determining what the project baseline should truly be. The process is patterned after what has been normally accepted as standard practice in commercial construction. The government practice has been to perform the early tradeoff studies and baseline development with little involvement from the AE. Exhaustive studies and documents were prepared to establish a very detailed baseline. This was done to justify a budget cycle that took years to complete. The new process will use parametric schedules and estimates based on a schematic level of design. These will establish the initial budget baseline. Once the budget baseline is established, the remainder of the project is performed using a design-to-cost approach. The financial baseline is fixed, and scope and schedule are adjusted to fit. This hard-line approach will help trim future budgets and allow taxpayer dollars to be used more effectively and to achieve greater results in Hanford clean-up.

One such Hanford inter-contractor team, the Commercial Facilities Implementation Team, is challenging the old management process involving projects similar to those being performed in private industry (e.g., buildings, roads, etc.). The team is developing a streamlined technique based on the best practices of industry and government. It is challenging the need for governmental requirements, when industry consensus codes and standards are more than sufficient. The American Institute of Architects’ process for managing construction projects is being used as a model for the team development. The team process model minimizes rework by early involvement of the architect-engineer to ensure each project deliverable builds on prior accomplishments, rather than perpetuating redundant efforts.

The Commercial Facilities Implementation/Richland Operations Office Team is breaking down barriers currently within the DOE system. They hope to minimize and/or eliminate the dependency on DOE requirements documents through the use of commercially accepted practices, consensus codes, and standards. By implementing industry-accepted codes and standards, the team process is being refined and validated by several pilot projects and a Value Engineering workshop planned for early fiscal year 1995. The CFIT process potentially will save 15 to 17 percent off the normal total project cost. Once developed, this process will be applied to whole or parts of TWRS projects that meet the team criteria.

There has been a constant flow of ideas in contracting change in TWRS. For example, one current proposal would potentially privatize the TWRS function. Privatization would contract out a function that is presently being performed through cost plus award fee contracts. The privatized contractor only receives payment when the product or service is delivered. This can represent a sizable risk for the contractor, as no progress payments or hourly wages are paid by the government. The unsolicited proposal [5] to build a private plant to pretreat and vitrify the tank waste was sparked by outside interests. The DOE wants to ensure the lowest possible cost to the taxpayer for such a service. They are exploring vendor interest in competitively bidding a fixed price contract for one or more TWRS functions. To date, the DOE has advertised for commercial firms interested in building a private vitrification plant. The contractor would finance construction of the facility on Richland Operations Office-controlled land and would not receive payment until actual production of vitrified waste product. The main benefits to the contractor would be the approximately 20-year profit potential and the ability to perform to less costly commercial nuclear requirements and standards without compromising safety.

Learning from Our Challenges: Tips for Managing Change

Through many changes the TWRS team maintains a positive approach. It strives for excellence through application of lessons learned. To be successful, TWRS knows it must:

  • Stick to clear objectives. TWRS is careful to keep sight on the end goal. Systems engineering has helped ensure every activity contributes to the common objective. This regimen defines necessary functions to achieve the goal. All work must feed a predefined function, or it receives very close scrutiny before allocation of resources.
  • Keep the team lean. Staff to a lean and cost-effective level. Each staffing request is carefully examined. TWRS makes the effort to hire from within before searching externally for personnel. Displaced employees are retrained to perform new functions. This has helped to balance upward and downward swings in the work force. A lean work force can respond to change quicker.
  • Avoid redundant/wasteful practices. Challenge existing practices. Management listens to new ideas and is not afraid to responsibly invest employee resources to pursue better ideas. The investment pays huge dividends over time. To stimulate new ideas, it has helped bring new blood to the brainstorming sessions and/or move folks into new areas of work. This breaks up old turf barriers and injects new concepts.
  • Consider consolidation. Prior to consolidation, the operating contractor and the engineer-constructor were co-contractors. When the DOE reassigned the engineering-constructor contract to the operating contractor, there was a need to break down old barriers. This is being accomplished through transfer of personnel between each company, based on a realignment of functions. Old dividing lines are now more difficult to find. A greater sense of cooperation is being developed by having personnel who were once co-workers represent the two companies trying to consolidate redundant functions. Personnel working side-by-side toward a common goal accomplish more.
  • Avoid change for change's sake. The team has been careful not to make process changes faster than the field can adapt. Management evaluates change impacts to ensure sufficient value added offsets the disruption.
  • Don't forget about your people. In the constantly changing TWRS environment, people need steady and consistent management support. TWRS management places human concerns on a high priority, whether it be associated with work or home. In a high hazard environment, nothing is potentially more dangerous to themselves or others than a worker not thinking about the tasks at hand.
Dedication

This article is based on many ideas and innovations developed by the Construction Projects organization, Michael A. Siano, director. Mr. Siano encouraged teamwork among his people and motivated them in the pursuit of innovative project management techniques and methods. Through his inspiration, guidance, and friendship the benefits from these ideas are being realized. Mr. Siano died on July 29, 1994. This article is dedicated to his memory.

References

1. Wodrich, Don. 1994. Tank Waste Remediation System Integrated Technology Plan, DOE/RL-92-61 (Draft). U.S. Department of Energy.

2. 1991. Tank Waste Disposal Program Redefinition, WHC-EP-0475.

3. Gerber, Michelle Stenehjem. 1992. On the Home Front: The Cold Front Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site. University of Nebraska Press.

4. Gerber, Michelle S. 1992. Legends and Legacy, Fifty Years of Defense Production at the Hanford Site. WHC-MR-0293. Westing-house Hanford Co.

5. Briggs, Wanda. 1994. DOE to Seek Vit Plant Bids .… Tri-City Herald (August 9).

6. Chatters, J.C. 1989. Hanford Cultural Resources Management Plan. PNL-6942. Pacific Northwest Laboratory.

7. 1994. Tank Waste Remediation System Facility Configuration Study. WHC-SD-WM-ES-295, R.0.

8. Alumkal, W.T., executive vice president, Tank Waste Remediation System, to T.R. Sheridan, acting program manager, Office of Tank Waste Remediation System, U.S. DOE. 1994. Configuration Selection for the Tank Waste Remediation System. Letter number 9454691 (July 18).

9. 1989. Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement), Fourth Amendment (May 15).

10. 1994. A Research and Development—Potential Sources Sought. Commerce Business Daily, Issue No. PSA-1162 (August 18).

11. 1994. Treatment and Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste at the Hanford Site: The Technical Challenge. WHC-SA-2551-FP.

12. 1988. Environmental Impact Statement and Record of Decision—The Record of Decision (ROD) (DOE 1988) on the Final Environmental Impact Statement, Disposal of Hanford Defense High-Level, Transuranic and Tank Wastes, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington (HDW-EIS) (DOE 1987).

13. 1992. The Future for Hanford Uses and Cleanup—Summary of the Final Report of the Hanford Future Site Uses Working Group.

David S. Kelly, PMP, is a senior engineer for Westinghouse Hanford Company, serving as a project engineer for special projects and providing internal project management consulting to the Construction Projects organization.

Craig Kuhlman is senior communications specialist in external communications/media relations for Westinghouse Hanford Company, specializing in project communications and issues management.

PM Network • March 1995

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