LE PROJET DU SIECLE
The idea of a Fixed Link between Britain and the European mainland was first seriously considered in Napoleonic times. Since then, plan after plan has been suggested. A tunnel was even started in 1880 only to be stopped two years later after British fears of an invasion became too great. Nearly a century later, in 1975, another start was aborted on political rather than military grounds.
Still the idea would not go away and today not one but three tunnels link the United Kingdom and France as part of what the French press has dubbed Le Projet du Siecle—the Project of the Century
Transmanche-Link (TML) is the contractor responsible for designing constructing and commissioning what is generally known as the Channel Tunnel but which is in fact a project encompassing far more than the trio of tunnels under the Channel. As such, it is acting on behalf of its client, Eurotunnel. A totally separate entity, Eurotunnel will own and operate the Fixed Link once it is completed. It is the world's largest privately funded construction project to date-with no government funding whatsoever. Instead, the largest banking syndicate even put together is providing the equity
TML is a consortium of ten major construction companies: five British and five French (see right). When first formed in 1986 it had a total staff of six. At peak that figure rose to nearly 14,500 and daily expenditure averaged over $5.5 million.
While TML exists in a liaison capacity to coordinate the project, two separate companies were formed to carry out the work on their respective sides of the Channel: GIE Transmanche Construction based in Calais, France, and Translink Joint Venture which is headquartered in the U.K.
All over the world people refer to the project as the Channel Tunnel, or even the Chunnel. Media attention centred on the tunneling and the tunnelers. Distances dug were monitored avidly, breakthroughs were heralded, and a huge part of the project has been virtually ignored.
TML is responsible for far more than driving some 170 kilometres of tunnels between Folkestone in the U.K. and Coquelles in France. It is, in fact, creating and commissioning an entire transportation system.
The system is in essence a railway and two of the three tunnels now under the Channel will carry high-speed mainline passenger and freight trains between the U.K. and France, as well as special shuttle trains loaded with vehicles and their drivers and passengers. These shuttles' locos and wagons (the largest, most sophisticated wagons ever built) are TML's responsibility, as are the rails on which they run, the catenary that brings power to them, the state-of-the-art signaling that guides them and any number of other ancillary systems essential to a twenty-first century railway. They have all had to be designed, purchased, fitted and commissioned.
At either end of the Eurotunnel system between England and France two huge terminals have been designed and built from scratch—by TML. Where there were once just fields, tracks have been laid, platforms, access ramps and associated bridges built and service buildings erected. Each Terminal could in its own right be counted among the biggest civil engineering jobs carried out in Europe during the closing decades of the century.
Of course, the tunnels are the heart of the system. The two large Running Tunnels carrying the railway have a smaller Service Tunnel separating them (which has its own mini, purpose-built transportation system). Massively complex drainage, cooling and ventilation systems have also had to recreated and to make the concrete segments which line the tunnels, TML built its own facilities on both sides of the Channel. In output terms, they were the equal to any precast concrete works in the world.
The prime technical objective of the Fixed Link is to join the principal road and rail networks of the U.K. and France. However, it will also form part of a major revision of transportation systems in Europe as a whole. There are at least 100 million people within just a 300-mile radius of the tunnels but the ramifications are expected to extend even further, particularly within the so-called London/Frankfurt/Milan Golden Triangle.
Total cross-Channel travel has increased substantially in recent years and it is foreseen that this growth will continue, with the Fixed Link's share in the year 2000 predicted to be 44.6 million passengers and 26.8 million tonnes of freight.
The linking of the rail networks of the U.K. and mainland Europe will also create a new competitive opportunity for the railways vis a vis both sea and air transportation.
When the tunnel opens, through passenger trains operated by British Rail and SNCF (the French Railways) as well as the SNCB (the Belgium Railways) are expected to travel between London and Paris in just three hours. If a high speed rail link between the London and the U.K. Terminal at Folkestone is built, this will be reduced by a further thirty minutes.
The railways expect their passenger service to be competitive with air services in terms of both price and time of journey
In addition, the movement of freight over greater distances by a single mode of transport, with consequent improvements in reliability and speed is expected to lead to a substantial increase in the railways' share of the cross-Channel market. Freight trains will directly connect centres in different parts of the U.K. with a range of places in Continental Europe and will be able to reach most major destinations within 36 hours.
Both road and rail users will be able to take advantage of such time-saving advantages of the Fixed Link in the near future. They will enjoy this thanks to organisational and management techniques which have allowed its creation, despite the vast size and scope of the project, in just seven years.
Excavating the French cross-over to reveal the already-built tunnel.
Photography by Q.A. Photos Limited, Hythe, Kent, England
With particular reference to European transport infrastructure and multinational partnerships, TML Chief Executive Jack K. Lemley discusses how, in an ideal world, consortia should be formed, while recognizing, as in the case of the Channel Tunnel, that the real world does not always allow all the rules to be followed.
The free movement of goods and people goes to the very heart of the European ideal. The establishment of high quality infrastructure, including the completion of the network's “missing links” of which many such as the Channel Tunnel are trans-frontier, is essential if the vision behind the Treaty of Rome is to become a reality.
This is a huge challenge. Solving it requires close partnership between governments, financiers and contractors. It also requires partnerships or joint ventures between contractors and, in some cases, across national borders, as many of the projects are too big or too complex for a single contractor. In addition, such joining of forces will often be the only way to compete with the much bigger Japanese and U.S. companies.
As experience on the Channel Tunnel has shown, making these joint ventures is easier said than done.
THE THEORY
The formation of any consortium is a commitment to the future, something that is doubly true of transportation infrastructure projects, particularly when they link diverse nations and cultures. Such projects, by their very nature connect peoples, territories and assets that have been separated not only by physical but also by cultural, social and economic differences which may not become fully apparent until the reality of the connection is imminent. Often, partners only discover after construction has begun that there is more to being partners than just the wish to do so.
It is essential that the owners as well as contractors spend the time, before an agreement is signed and large sums of money are spent, to explore rigourously what the contract entails. This includes pursuing the cultural, sociological and political implications, as well as the technical, financial and other more demonstrable aspects. Infrastructure projects are usually designed to solve a communications problem but there are problems of internal communication within the joint venture which must be addressed and solved.
Tunnel Crossovers
In addition, once the contract has been signed and work has begun, the parties must continue to build on and enhance the fundamental principles upon which the venture was founded. This means developing an appropriate, achievable vision for the project and communicating it to all parties to the contract, both internal and external.
Many reasons can exist for partnerships to be formed, each of which takes on a degree of importance that depends on the technical, political, cultural and other factors operative during the pre-contract phase. Projects like the Channel Tunnel Fixed Link, for example, usually have their origins in the conclusion by one or two firms that a task, usually projected by a government or financial agency, can be undertaken by them only with the aid of others. Pre-planning then becomes paramount.
Before forming any partnership, an analysis must be made of the task to be performed and the resources necessary for its completion. If this means expenditure, it is money well spent. The desire to press on must be weighed against the fact that many projects fail before a contract is signed, before ground has been broken.
If the project is of any size or complexity, it should become apparent at this stage that specific skills beyond those of the initiating company are required. What will be needed depends almost entirely upon the nature of the project. For example, a consortium is frequently formed more to share financial risk than to provide specific engineering or construction resources. In this case there is little difficulty in setting out roles and responsibilities. Normally, one of the partners will take the lead in managing the partnership in terms of construction while the others will support the overall endeavour with its credit and financial resources.
Partner selection may be time-based, too. As the needs of the project become more sophisticated and involved the partners will undoubtedly have to contribute expertise and active participation if not throughout the project, then at certain specific stages of its development.
The First Breakthrough. The funnel boring machine completes the French Land Service Tunnel
Photography by Q.A. Photos Limited, Hythe, Kent, England
Consideration must also be given to the desirability of subcontracting or directly hiring the required expertise. A subcontract is established and managed in quite a different manner than a partnership, and can be designed to accomplish quite specific ends which, in the course of setting out the responsibilities of the consortium's partners, can become obscured.
The various technical resources necessary are dictated by the type of work involved. The pre-planning phase of joint venture formation should dearly establish what is required.
As participating contractors examine these requirements, more often than not they come to realise it is necessary to add specific resources to their own in order to have a complete capability. They must determine first if the capability exists elsewhere or can be developed in a timely cost-effective manner, within their own organisation.
There is also the need to consider sociological, legal, political and similar issues. Either the partners forming the consortium feel qualified to handle them or other expertise must be brought in, either through direct participation as a partner, or as a consultant or subcontractor. These so-called “extra-contractual” aspects of a project are often what make or break it.
Related to this is the issue of the cultural environment, both corporate and national. As the European Community comes closer together, organisations and entities across Europe will of necessity undertake a large number of programmed that require partnering. History tells us that the barriers to such partnering are formidable. Distinct and individual languages and cultures govern and provide the foundations for wider variations in legal systems, financial institutions, and personal characteristics.
The cultural issues are difficult to come to terms with because each joint venture, as it matures, must go beyond national cultural distinctions to develop a corporate culture commensurate with the project's established vision. In doing so, care must be taken to understand the approach of each partner to problem solving and issues such as ethics and the levels of professionalism required for various activities. It is important that there is an appreciation of the organisational culture by all members of the consortium, at all levels. In the long-term, such communication and the development of channels through which it can freely flow is perhaps the most important aspect of the partnership.
The consortium's approach to management and organisation structure is both extremely important and highly sensitive, especially in the ad hoc world of construction where contracts are put together to solve a particular set of circumstances over a specified period of time. Establishing, understanding and communicating the corporate culture are essential elements of a smoothly managed relationship. If channels of communication are developed from the first and rigorously supported during the formative stages of the consortium, the project's vision and goals can be extended in a more controlled fashion as the identified mission is accomplished. Ongoing and regular contact by the management of the various members of the consortium must be carefully nurtured. To some extent, this can be accomplished through regular management or supervisory board meetings, but it must be done on a regular basis, and it must extend from and beyond such formal meetings to the whole organisation. If there is room for creativity in management, it must begin here.
Any major development requires great sums of money and it is necessary for all concerned that financial considerations be thoroughly analysed. This is particularly true of mega-projects where the worth of all the consortium partners combined will not usually equal the value of the contract. Inclusion of a resource expert capable of understanding and handling the implications of project financial concerns, both internal and external, is in most cases a necessity In the case of government ownership, finance may come from the public purse. More and more frequently it comes from outside private sources. Either way, the consortium must be reimbursed on a regular basis for the real work done, or the project cannot be carried forward expeditiously or with full concentration on the mission.
When privatisation is discussed, much has been made of BOT (Build, Own/Operate and Transfer) facilities. Fundamental to the success of any BOT project is the idea that the government or other sponsoring entity must uphold its end of the implied Partnership. When a concession is awarded and an organisation takes up the challenge of developing a facility to fulfilthe concession agreement, there is a certain reliance on the part of the developer that the Government entity granting the concession for the right to develop the facility will also fully support its development. Failure to do so will in all likelihood result in the failure of the partnership,
THE REALITY
So much for the rules. In most mega-projects, however, their full application to the formation of a joint venture or consortium knot always easy The evolution of the Transmanche-Link consortium (TML) from concept to reality in a complex, politically sensitive environment is a case in point.
After the British and French governments accepted the offer of a group of British and French bank to carry out a study of the feasibility of a privately funded scheme to cross the Channel, a historic meeting between banks and contractors took place on March 9, 1983. At that meeting, the decision was made to put forward a tunnel scheme with equal British and French involvement.
Unfortunately the consortium was unable to practice some of the rules. Throughout 1984 and 1985 it was unclear whether or not a concession would be awarded, either to the tunneling group or to others. In those circumstances none of the partners was willing to risk the large sums involved in research and pre-planning.
In contrast, once the governments made a decision, speed became of the essence if this single window of opportunity was not to be missed. Whether it was liked or not, the project was on a fast track.
In February 1986, the French and British governments signed the Treaty of Canterbury which was the basic agreement between the governments that a Fixed Link project should go ahead. It provided for the all-important guarantee against political cancellation and for the grant of a concession to a private group of promoters.
Then, the March 1986 Concession Agreement authorised the successful promoting group, made up of construction firms and banking interests, to construct the tunnel “at their own risk and without recourse to government funds or government financial or commercial guarantees, regardless of whatever hazards may be encountered.” (The Concession, which lasts for 55 years, is the basic instrument regulating the Fixed Link.)
Thus a private group had to raise all of the capital necessary to design and build the project as well as to fund the start-up and commissioning of the transportation system itself. The contractor, TML, was then progressively separated from the prospective owner, Eurotunnel, to allow the latter to concentrate on raising project finance and the former to prepare proposals for submission to Eurotunnel for the design, construction and commissioning of the project.
Five British companies known as Translink and five French companies known as Transmanche combine to form Transmanche-Link, or TML, so the term ‘culture’ has always had both national and corporate sides. As might be expected during the initial phase of the project, the conduct of the work at the sites on either side of the Channel was generally separate and distinct since conditions for each were unique. TML's organisation was established with this in mind, allowing the project to get off to a very fast start (see Organising The Project).
Over the years the management structure has evolved to keep pace with the evolution of the project. Throughout, communication, both flexible and total, has focussed on making the relationship between the different disciplines and nationalities involved work for the good of all.
In national terms, the TML partnering was based upon a complete respect for the two cultures involved, as well as upon a commitment to create channels of communication to ensure that cultural differences would not be ignored but used to the advantage of both parties. This meant respecting the way people do things at all levels.
Although British and French work habits are quite different, both teams are getting the job done with equal commitment and Professionalism and each is accomplishing this with equal attention to quality and safety using the techniques and work practices with which they are most familiar. If one rigid set of rules had been imposed on the project, the project would not be where it is today with the three tunnels completed and being fitted out.
An engineering decision that illustrates how TML has used such different professional approaches to its advantage is the two crossover chambers located at the one-third points from the tunnel entrances. These huge chambers, the largest undersea caverns in the world at 158 metres long, 18 metres wide and 10.5 metres high, will allow trains to change tracks for maintenance purposes. The one closest to England was essentially constructed as a single arched chamber using the New Austrian Tunneling Method, or NATM techniques. It was constructed before the main rail tunnel's boring machines (TBMs) arrived, using access from the service tunnel. In contrast, the chamber on the French side was constructed after the TBMs had passed through its location, and was formed, in effect, by drilling a series of small parallel tunnels which themselves formed when connected an arch over the chamber, after which the earth below could be removed. Both chambers perform the same function. Both were constructed in a timely, cost-effective manner, and each was constructed using the techniques most familiar to those who were to build them.
In summary, a joint venture of consortium is a partnership, a group of people working towards a common goal. Nonetheless, cultural differences cannot be ignored. Workers from different construction disciplines as well as those from different nations have their own way of doing things. At TML, it is understood that tunnelers do not operate in the same manner as transportation engineers and that a French worker approaches his task from a different set of values than a British worker. The important point is that these are only differences, not better or worse ways of doing things.
By working with and using these cultural differences instead of ignoring them or, worse, trying to impose one rigid set of rules over the whole project, TML has gained through a kind of cultural synergy. In short, cultural differences should be considered as opportunities, something that can add value to the total project culture you are creating.
Jack K. Lemley is the chief executive officer of Transmanche-Link and currently presides over the construction of the Channel Tunnel between Great Britain and France.
After obtaining his B.A. in architecture from the University of Idaho in 1960, Jack began an illustrious career in the construction industry. He was with the Guy F. Adkinson Company for 17 years, where he worked on several major engineering/construction projects. In 1977 Jack joined Morrison-Knudsen Company where his projects included the King Khalid Military City Project in Saudi Arabia, the $800 million OK Tedi gold and copper mine development in Papua New Guinea, and the $1.9 billion Cerrejon Coal Mine, Railroad and Port Facility in Colombia. He was senior vice president of the Morrison-Knudsen Construction Division from 1985 to 1987. Jack assumed the leadership of the Blount Construction Group of Blount, Inc., in 1987 as its president and chief executive officer. In 1988, he formed Lemley & Associates, Inc., a management consulting firm.
Jack's innovative construction management career, capped by his current responsibilities at Transmanche-Link, brought him to the attention of awards committees. Engineering News-Record voted him “Man of the Year” for 1991. The American Society of Civil Engineers has honored him with its Construction Management Award, the Beavers have presented him the Golden Beaver Award for Supervision, and the University of Idaho has installed him into their Alumni Hall of Fame. He is a member of the Beavers, the Moles, and United States and International Committees on Large Dams, and has served as president of the International Tunneling Association.
In describing the management of the world's largest-ever privately funded construction project, most of the organisational entities will be recognizable to those familiar with large, complex projects. These familiar patterns, however, have been pushed to their limits by the size, scale and complexity of the Channel Tunnel Fixed Link, requiring in many cases new or alternative schemes to be developed.
For example, in addition to the relationship between Eurotunnel, the owner, and TML, the contractor, lines of communication have also been established to an Intergovernmental Commission (IGC). Its duty is to oversee the development of the project and satisfy both the British and French governments with regard to the Concession Agreement, the basic instrument regulating the Fixed Link.
The French Terminal seen from the air in the spring of ’91.
Photography by Q.A. Photos Limited, Hythe, Kent, England
The Commission ensures that all safety standards are carefully developed and followed. In addition, it seeks to ensure that the transportation system is not only built using efficient, state-of-the-art technology but also subsequently provides the best in terms of safety and convenience to users.
The concept of a Maitre d'Oeuvre is fairly well established in France but has no exact equivalent in the United Kingdom. The closest comparison would be the function of Project Manager, although there are some aspects of the position which are more in line with those of Managing Engineer.
On the Fixed Link the Maitre d'Oeuvre, broadly speaking, represents, through the Intergovernmental Commission, the technical interests of both the British and French governments. It provides an independent overview of the entire project, identifying potential problem areas and advising on remedial measures where they are considered necessary in the interests of the project.
A cross-section of the Chunnel showing geological strata and typography.
Parties of the Channel Tunnel Project
Inside Eurotunnel, elements concerned with project implementation are structured into the Project Implementation Division (PID). In addition, Eurotunnel has an Operations Department charged with developing operations procedures and bringing the operator's perspective to the ultimate design of the facility Input from the Operations Department enters the project development process through the PID which then works directly with TML to implement Eurotunnel's considerations.
TML itself, as explained elsewhere, is made up of ten companies: five British and five French. The five French companies are known as Transmanche and the five British as Translink. Both organisations are legal entities recognized in France and Britain under appropriate legal identification.
Both organisations, in turn, form Transmanche Link (TML), the contractor organisation which has the responsibility of coordinating the work between the United Kingdom and France. During the initial phase of the project the work on each site was generally separate and distinct, and TML's organisation reflected this.
There were two Directors General, each of whom had overall responsibility for construction in his respective country. As project wide engineering issues began to develop, the Director General of Transmanche took on the task of coordinating and managing all technical matters of the Transportation System, as well as Engineering, whilst his counterpart across the Channel took charge of Commercial and Financial matters related to the total project. Because the focus of the two Directors General was closely centred on the various elements needed to startup the work on each coast, the dual organisational structure allowed the project to get off to a very fast start.
As the project evolved so did the management structure. In mid-1989, as the civil engineering work got into full swing two Managing Directors were appointed. One oversaw all construction, ensuring that it was coordinated and consistent with the project d envelopment programme. The other oversaw all technical development, transportation systems and engineering issues, including rolling stock, and was responsible for coordinating them with the overall programme requirements.
The Directors General of Transmanche became the two site Directors for Construction. As such they had legal responsibility for operating these two entities in their respective countries. They came under the supervision of the TML Managing Director for Construction.
Today two Directors General, still fulfilling their operational and legal roles, report to the single Managing Director - Operations. This further streamlining of the upper echelons of management reflects the homogenization of the work on the two sides of the Channel where, in contrast to the start of the project, the work is essentially the same with the focus on the installation of virtually identical fixed equipment and the commissioning of the system as a whole.
However, other positions to be found on TML's organisation charts during all these changes are basically those to be found in most project organisations.
Several aspects of the project were made difficult by the nature and size of the programme. The work of harmonizing the need of the Transportation System Group with those of construction is a major example. It was achieved through the creation of a number of task forces which included representatives from each of the elements of the two Managing Directors' organisations and functional directors. These task forces generally addressed specific issues or interface problems needing close attention and careful analysis. Of necessity, work on such a fast track required close coordination and many compromises.
Three other significant consideration exist in the development of the Channel Tunnel Fixed Link. They involve the Intergovernmental Commission, the British and French Railways and the banks. While the Maitre d'Oeuvre serves as one contact point with the IGC, Eurotunnel also has formal communication with the Commission as regards the submission of data for approval and, in turn, the communicating to TML of the IGC'S position on various matters.
The national railways have their own unique requirements. With through-put agreements, both the SNCF (the French national railway) and British Rail will be important customers of Eurotunnel as well as the SNCB (the Belgium National Railway) when the Fixed Link becomes operational. As such, they have certain needs and requirements which must be met. As the project moves forwards, both railways have serious and continuing concerns about commissioning and start-up issues. As they are identified, TML's planning process is shaped to accommodate them.
Lastly the banks have a continuing interest in the project. There were originally 5 agent banks, to which were added 18 instructing banks to coordinate the overall interest of all 208 banks making up the lending consortium for the debt issue. They, together with the European Investment Bank, have supported the financing of the project. The banks have a technical adviser who provides them with an overview of the development of the project. Their concerns and interests are satisfied by a number of regular reports between Eurotunnel and the technical adviser, as well as by the technical adviser's attendance at certain meetings held between Eurotunnel, the Maitre d'Oeuvre and TML. Thus the communication loop includes all interested parties.