Under a functional or program organization, the middle management tend to consider the issues from a single product or function in isolation. The CEO is the ultimate and only point of integration between resources and products. By withholding delegation, the CEO postpones the acquisition of effective behavior and perpetrates the need for help. In addition, as the complexity of work and scarcity of resources are felt, the president becomes remote from the sources of information. The overloading amount of data makes it difficult to see the forest from the trees. Aggregation via computer summaries is subject to the data reduction loss. A need for lower levels of integration becomes imminent. To this end, matrix is only one option among others. This article outlines the criticism about matrix, reviews the condition and prerequisites for a matrix structure and the critical factors to ensure its success.
2. DEFINITION & APPROACH
Matrix is based on the principle of dual or multiple command structure where the employee reports to more than one boss. It has emerged in the early sixties shortly after the inception of NASA which is also a paramilitary innovative institution. The objective was to speed up the velocity of the decision-making process to surpass the USSR in the aerospace race. This was achieved through the integration of different functions at lower levels of NASA hierarchy. Matrix is relatively recent as a form of business organization. The concept was borrowed from biology. In the family, the child has two masters: the father and the mother. Since the beginning of mankind, societies could rarely cope with a dual chain of command and either became patriarcal or matriarcal. Matrix is not an improvement over functional or program hierarchies, but a compromise between these extremes. Going matrix should be by necessity not by desire. In fact, there is no ideal organizational form. Furthermore, even within the same corporation, mixed structures may indeed coexist and prove more productive than pure organization forms such as a total functional or a complete matrix operation.
Matrix should not happen overnight. Full scale implementation should be gradual and consistent with the capacity of human resources particularly management’s ability to unfreeze previous behavior, attitudes, values, and to learn, experiment and consolidate the new behavior required. The program manager’s perception of matrix is subjective. Unless the manager feels the functional support is good, she/he will be dissatisfied. Despite the best efforts in preventive and contingency planning, problems do occur.
3. CRITICISM OF MATRIX
Turning to the disadvantages or the criticisms which have been expressed of matrix, it may be observed that they are generally of two kinds. Some criticisms are more or less absolute in nature, tending to cast doubt upon the very idea of matrixing personnel; others are less general, directing attention to defects in the implementation and administration of matrix. Under the first heading is the allegation that without unity of command, the decision-making process suffers, responsibility is dispersed and accountability becomes extremely difficult if not impossible to pin down. Some functional managers tend to share this view, particularly after a poorly planned reorganization. They feel that matrix organizations are uncontrollable. They object to the dual accounting systems, dual evaluation processes, dual rewards, dual measurements and controls and the on-going challenge of cost and charges by program managers.
Other objections to matrix are expressed in terms of “cultural shock.” By this is meant the possible undesirable effects upon an individual who is suddenly transported from a single authority to a complex “command” structure. The subordinate is subjected rapidly to possibly disturbing experiences such as pressure from multiple sources of veto, need for high information processing capacity, resources sharing and interpersonal conflict situations of greater or lesser importance. It must be said that in corporations with highly proactive leadership and adequate preparation, the majority of matrixed persons react to these shocks rather very well and adjust relatively quickly to the new environment. In fact, Canadian Marconi Avionics Division has been flourishing ever since General Manager, Keith Glegg, has spearheaded its matrix efforts in 1968. The capacity to undertake new client projects grew so rapidly and assignments have been forthcoming to the point where after ten years, market demand for Marconi skyrocketed. Client’s praise for Avionics’ management excellence has become worldwide. By the end of the 70’s, one could hear flattering comments such as: “the next worst thing to losing a contract is getting one”! In short, Canadian Marconi took on the new structure so completely that it would be extremely difficult for many to return to a functional base. Some project managers particularly at Digital Equipment Corporation, come to fear the cultural shock in reverse and could not imagine a return to a pre-matrix era.
In era to neutralize the dysfunctional criticism, management must ascertain that matrix is indeed necessary to optimize results, and if so, ensure its success by adequate planning and a gradual implementation. These topics are analyzed in the following sections.
4. CONDITIONS & PREREQUISITES FOR MATRIX
Joe who has been personnel director of the British subsidiary of a U.S. company spent two years struggling to get a matrix organization. He now reports not only to the British president, but also to the personnel vice president in the U.S. headquarters. In order to discharge his responsibility he must visit the North American boss on a quarterly basis. Although he seemed happier about the job under the new set up, his superiors did not perceive any improvement in performance and asked him to resign. During the exit interview Joe was asked how come matrix did not meet expectations. Joe challenged the argument and reacted “How else could I visit North America 4 times a year for free?” Fortunately this dramatic case is certainly an exception. However, it illustrates the point namely that reorganization moves may be partly influenced by personal needs. Thus, it always pays to know the hidden motives, if any. The problem is to accurately find out what they are!
Apart from personal motives, what are the conditions that necessitate a matrix structure?
There are 5 necessary conditions that must exist for matrix to improve work:
(i) On-going conflict over work priorities:
Several projects/jobs are now equally important. Customers must be served. There is no second class citizen. Moreover, the corporation wants consciously to retain or seek leadership not only in technological expertise and know-how but also to retain its clients and expand its market base. Concurrent effort is required. The day-to-day priorities are not clear even if the job overall priority is well known. Joint consultations are required to review workload from multiple perspectives and set the day-to-day resource allocation based not only on the importance of the project but also on urgency, availability of resources and risk.
(ii) Scarcity of resources:
Proactive organizations keep their glass full and drink the spill over. There is always more work than the company can handle at any given time. Skilled resources are in high demand and used to capacity. Scarcity of talent will be felt no matter how preventive is the long term planning process. Scarcity creates conflict. Conflict must be managed from a differentiation integration perspective.
(iii) Pressure from high information processing capacity:
Several forces are in motion concurrently including competitive markets, changing external demands, technology dynamics, pressure to sustain corporate growth and performance motives. The combined impact of these forces makes it impossible for anyone to hold more than half-truths about the current situation. Up to date information is widely dispersed throughout the organization, despite the best efforts in data processing and complexity reduction systems. The challenge is real.
For the majority of decisions required in a complex organization, the higher the referral point the more likely the decision will be based on authority rather than on the knowledge of pertinent information.Yet in functional organizations the CEO is the ultimate integrator to bridge the gap between between engineering, marketing, finance, personnel, R&D and manufacturing. She/he is the only one who can see that the corporate interests are preserved from all perspectives. Unless the organization is in a traditional slow-moving sector, the president’s knowledge of the state of the art in each functional area, even in the best case, will be progressively less current that his functional lieutenants. The decisions would increasingly be made based on authority rather than knowledge of the facts. In addition, given the ultimate integrator role, the demand for decisions will tax the president’s time beyond limits. The response time does inherently go up creating bottlenecks and costly delays in many areas. The quality of decisions suffer as a result.
In order to increase the corporate capacity to process information and produce timely decisions, lower levels of integration are required. The decision point should be based on the location and the sources of information rather than the position in the hierarchy (Beckhard).
(iv) Attitude and Cultural expectations: tolerance of dual command
The first three conditions are necessary but not sufficient to go matrix particularly in a culture where unity of command is almost worshipped. In Zaire or India, the business organization could face the three conditions but the idea of depriving the boss from monopoly on subordinates is tantamount to a severe “castration.” The culture does not permit a matrix (dual boss structure). I also recall back in 1973 when we started a series of workshops on matrix, a small businessman from Alabama equated the structure with socialism. Participative management meant to him: “They participate and I manage.” Nowadays, the North American society is rapidly changing to the point where the culture increasingly challenges authority particularly in a system of unity of command. In order to achieve its mission, the corporation wants to earn a “reasonable” profit, fight pollution, attract skillful resources, and fulfill its role as a “corporate citizen.” The post-war generation expects to participate more actively in the decision making process than the pre-war counterpart. Authority is challenged more openly. Many believe knowledge power rather than the level of authority should determine decisions. Young MBAs perceive more fairness in the dual command structure than older professionals, and expect external forces to shift the process toward group decision-making.
In the late sixties and early seventies, these attitudes were controversial to say the least, resulting in retaliatory action particularly by lower and middle management. Increased insight and considerable learning are now leading to a supportive climate and a proactive rather than reactive top management behavior. Under these circumstances, cultural expectations are conducive to matrix. However should the CEO’s desire to go matrix not be shared by management at large, several strategies can be explored before giving up or forcing the structure “down their throat.” Extensive pre-work may be prescribed to unfreeze skepticism and hostility toward the change prior to going matrix. To this end, educational interventions, pilot experiments and behavior modification guidance could be explored to help individuals examine principles, beliefs and values and discard what is no longer useful.
(v) Relative tenure stability:
Even if the four above conditions existed, the average job tenure must be at least four to five years. A full matrix organization requires at least two yeares before reaching the “break-even point.” Adequate returns are only felt after the third year. That is why, matrix modes have been a dismal failure in several government agencies, particularly in the seventies where job tenure witnessed a high turnover rate for public service professionals. Citicorp-Citibank, Canadian Marconi, TRW Systems Group and NASA, among others, report a two years learning period. More recently, several branches of the Government of Canada have expressed a renewed interest in matrix with perhaps more realistic expectations. For ministries disrupted by austerity cutbacks and shoestring budgtets offset by increased personnel stability, matrix could be attractive.
These five conditions are necessary and sufficient to shift gears to matrix. Top management should not write-off the present functional or product structure before ascertaining that the above conditions are met, otherwise matrix is counter-indicative because there are easier ways to get results as indicated below.
The existence of condition 1 alone may be handled through decentralization assuming adequate resources. The existence of the second condition leads to job sequencing or splitting assuming different priorities and no conflicting urgency. The existence of condition 1 and 2 combined can be handled by a liaison group or an integrating/expediting unit as usually encountered in the aerospace sector (General Dynamics, DeHavilland, Northrop, Lockheed Georgia and Lockheed California). It assumes the liaison unit has the necessary information processing capacity to trade-off jobs and resources. The existence of condition three either alone or including one, could be adequately addressed by adding slack resources at the top of the organization. The existence of condition 2 and 3 would be resolved by job sequencing, job staggering and automation or elimination of tasks with low priority, uncertainty and high information processing needs combined. The existence of condition four alone (i.e., cultural pressure for multiple command structure) can be managed through a greater decentralization and redistribution of authority. On the other hand, the presence of the opposite condition (i.e., low tolerance for matrix) requires a collateral organization in addition to the formal hierarchy. The collateral organization could be a steering committee to deal with boundary management issues and emulate matrix. The absence of condition 5 requires a hard look at the staffing policies, something very few states and provincial governments are ready to challenge. Matrix can be fatal particularly if the tenure of program/project managers and functional heads is not relatively stable for the duration of their programs. Alternatively, slack resources should be sought to provide continuity and make up for the on-going fluctuations, a luxury that a few can afford in the aftermath of Proposition Thirteen. In addition, slack resources in the public sector are subject to the turnpike effect, i.e., availability invites utilization, the nice-to-have becomes essential.
From now on we assume that all five conditions exist. Purely structural changes are unlikely to lead systematically to improvement of corporate performance. Changes to matrix have typically incorporated many simultaneous changes in task design, responsibility and reward schemes, among others. Before embarking on the new structure, there are several planning and implementation issues that should be resolved, namely: the effectiveness of the matrixed person, the effectiveness of management, corporate growth, innovation and creativity, visibility of fat, problem-solving, enforcement of standards, learning and individual growth. These critical success factors are considered in the next section.
5. CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS FOR MATRIX ORGANIZATIONS
Shifting gears to matrix requires effective leadership, time for learning a new behavior, explicit strategies for behavior modification to unfreeze present behavior, attitude change through educational or other interventions, a system for management, and a contingency planning scheme. While the evidence on matrix is too sparce to make unqualified claims as to its effectiveness, the following are among the accepted determinants of matrix performance.
(a) Effectiveness of the matrixed person
Assuming the organization or some of its units have found it necessary to go matrix, there are several factors that should be considered by management and clearly understood by participants to the process as well as other parties with vested interest in the organizational success. These factors can spell the difference between the success or failure of matrixed staff. They are in reverse order of importance:
1. The physical work location of each matrixed individual:
Studies have indicated that loyalty is influenced by the location of work. An engineer whose work station is with engineering feels as a member of the functional group even so he/she may spend 80% of the time doing project work. Ideally, a matrixed person should feel part of both the project and the functional hierarches. That is why, several companies offer multiple offices or desks to matrixed staff to avoid the loyalty trap. When space is at a prohibitive premium or constrained by “compliance regulations,” a similar effect can be sought with multiple personalized phone lines or at least maintaining the individual’s name in the official staff lists and in/out boards of both the functional and the project settings. The impact is small and subtle but real and can be felt whenever the distance between locations is as short as 200 feet or even a different building floor.
2. The perceived responsibility for work allocation be the matrixed individual:
Under a non-matrix scheme, the functional boss assigns the day to day work. With matrix, once the skilled professional is a bona fide member of several projects, the day to day decisions about where he/ she is going to go require active and direct consultations between the performer and the project managers who may be competing for his/her services. Unless the performer is a newcomer or a junior professional, the functional manager’s contribution is not necessary for the day to day decisions, although he/she must be informed of the outcome of the group decision. By taking an active role in such decisions, functional managers, and the CEO for that matter, perpetrate the dependence on authority. Unless they promote forced collaboration between the performer and the respective project managers, the maturity of matrix will remain in doubt and may not survive the temptation to go the easy route. Like the children in the biological family, the matrixed subordinate can skillfully play one side of the hierarchy against another to escape the problems. Matrix staff should therefore call on the information sources to resolve work allocation conflicts, rather than go the authority route. A system of contrived contingencies to reinforce such behavior must be part of the corporate policy of matrix organizations.
3. The perceived reward/punishment power:
Many organizations have failed during the transition to matrix because the change to matrix was not complemented by a redesign of the employee appraisal process. Generally, the functional manager retains the reward/punishment power. Unless the subordinate work is evaluated jointly by those to whom his/her services are offered, the quality of performance will suffer. Loyalty will be skewed toward the perceived source of reward/punishment power. Even when the staffing and personnel policies are inadequate, functional managers should make it clear to subordinates that the project managers’ evaluation will be an integral part of the performance appraisal process regardless of the organizational chart settings.
Rewards and reprimands must be perceived as fair, relevant, timely and appropriate, Differentiated rewards or recognition credits can be implemented using pay schemes, token economy systems, group bonus, discretionary individual bonuses, office arrangements, meeting membership, special budgets, access to the CEO, sabbatical and other discretionary privileges.
4. The perceived role of management in the process:
While the responsibility for managing the program /project is vested with the program director, a top executive, sometimes the president, should play a support role in network-building particularly with major clients such as governments or political interest groups. Highly visible executives can facilitate the program manager’s job. In international projects, the perceived degree of commitment on the part of the project company can be extremely important (Benningson, 1977). Here the opportunities for business development, outside the project charter are most important. Care must be taken to ensure that the Godfather support is not construed as a disguised form of control.
5. Job clarity:
An essential ingredient of matrix is to enable the individual to engage his/her full potential toward corporate goals. Considerable attention must be paid to the job design to build-in a clear description of tasks while leaving enough room for individual initiative where required. The job description should be as close as possible to the performer’s perception with organization constraints in mind.
(b) Effectiveness of management:
Effective matrix organizations differ widely. What they have in common are:
— a proactive leadership capable of influencing the environment
— a determination to experiment with new ideas in selected areas to learn a new behavior
— a reasonable tolerance for risk-taking errors, i.e., it is normal to be wrong while practising
— a candid effort to share and learn from the past experience of others as well as one’s own successes and failures, i.e., the ability to stop the music and look at the process, review the norms and standards of work in an unthreatening way; This is called action-research mode or databased feedback.
— program/product managers are in a forced collaboration trap where their rewards and performance reviews are not only based on the results achieved in respective projects but also on how well they perform for the good of the corporation in decisions requiring cooperation, synergy or compromise across project boundaries
— functional managers are rewarded for the quality of resources, the adequacy of standards and the efforts in long term strategic planning, creativity, innovation, growth and macro-performance.
(c) Corporate growth:
A variety of claims have been made concerning the influence of matrix on growth, although documented evidence to support these claims has been not entirely satisfactory. It probably would be best not to base corporate growth on the idea of matrix alone. Outstanding growth must have a more stable base. In Japan, for example, the base is top-notch technology, the highest possible level of automation, an accurate and highly productive labor force, a functional hierarchy, plus cheap labor. Digital Equipment’s growth benefited from an expanding computer market, a trend toward minis and distributed processing and a relatively abundant supply of expertise resulting from RCA withdrawal and GE merger with Honeywell, plus matrix management. It should be considered as inevitable that as industries throughout the world will evolve to more technology and face a complex market, they will require more integration and sophisticated structural arrangements including matrix forms. Simple classical organization forms will be insufficient because they were conceived to fit the less dynamic world of yesterday. However to ensure that corporate growth is not sacrificed, matrixed companies should address the issue via a collateral organization or an ongoing Business Development Department with appropriate membership.
(d) Innovation and creativity:
North American superiority in technological innovation is being aggressively challenged by competitors from Europe and the Far East who enjoy a significant support from respective governments. The combined effects of several forces including both management constraints and external conditions account for the leadership erosion of all but a handful of strong sectors such as agriculture, data processing, telecommunications, aerospace and industrial heavy machinery where the gap is also narrowing. Among the external causes blocking innovation are stringent regulations, adverse tax policies, government cutbacks in research fundings, bureaucratic delays in decision-making, shortsighted advocacy groups and absence of active public support. However, the most potent constraints to corporate innovation can be found within the domain of management responsibility. The latter includes overemphasis on immediate profitability, a marginal effort to feedback new technology into corporate plans and decisions and a limited knowledge about the management of innovation and technological ventures, particularly during the transition from research to applied business development. Top management rewards, recognition and chances for advancement are usually designed to maximize the current year bottom line results and maintain the status quo despite future opportunity costs. By contrast, technology receives high management attention and active support in successful innovative organizations such as Texas Instruments, Digital Equipment, IBM, Polaroid, Tektronix, Analog Devices and Xerox.
Under a matrix structure, project/product directors are primarily concerned about the short term profitability. They must continually trade-off time, cost, quality and scope of work. The focus is to get results, the sooner the better. Therefore, the rate of innovation could suffer unless a special long term budget is set aside under the direct control of functional managers. While matrix organizations may not be exceedingly creative, they are certainly lucrative. In this context, both matrix and program organizations are capable of capitalizing on the research findings faster and better than functional counterparts. That is why a large Canadian petrochemical organization has recently moved to a mixed structure in R & D. Research scientists remained functionally structured while development staff have been matrixed with marketing, production and engineering; thus achieving a complementary structure. While not part of the matrix, research scientists maintain a vested interest in development projects and contribute in a consulting capacity on an ad hoc basis. Although the rate of innovation remained constant, a remarkable improvement in the success of new marketable products has been noticed.
(e) Visibility of fat:
Under non-matrix forms, the manager has a greater discretionary power in resource utilization and retention. The dual command structure tends to balance the bias found in these hierarchies where redundant and mediocre resources could go unnoticed. Matrixed managers challenge the usefulness of functional resources continually. Poor performers become more visible and cannot escape. The drive to trim the fat should be built in the system.
Policies should also be established with respect to the discretionary power of project managers to use in-house versus external help. By the same token, functional units should consider the pros and cons of acting as autonomous profit centres in lieu of operating solely on the basis of cost recovery. Thus ultimately, the functional expertise could conceivably be offered to both the organization and outside clients. In this context, the Systems & Computer Services (S & CS) of DuPont of Canada found it to the company’s advantage to share a large data processing service with Dominion Textiles. Without the consortium with Domtex, the daily fluctuations of DuPont workload requirements would have made a corporate data centre inefficient. The resulting spare capacity would have been prone to new systems which may be desirable but unnecessary. Instead, the perceptive S & CS general manager, Ed Briggs, opted for an optimum utilization of corporate resources. The functional data processing service became a profit centre generating additional cash flow at a critical time in the early seventies.
(f) Problem-solving:
Functional organizations tend to efficiently deal with problems which can be corrected through known and established behavior. Cueing functions are usually well learned and integrated to direct feedback and repetitive problem-solving. When it does work, matrix provides a capability to deal with fuzzy situations, ill-defined tasks and unforeseen problems where the solutions whave not yet been identified and must be discovered through a direct contact of multiple information sources.
Organizations shifting to matrix should, whenever possible, clearly identify situations where individual or group-solving is expected and the appropriate behaviour required. Alternatively, chaos or groupitis could result. Groupitis is a tendency to abuse the group approach to problem solving.
(g) Standards:
Technical standards and corporate quality norms are established and enforced by functional management. Productivity gains and efficiency of resources cannot be achieved without appropriate standards. However, defacto acceptance of standards by project managers could be fatal to the project as recently experienced by NASA. The first satellite to carry the microwave radar, Seasat A, failed last fall after only three months in orbit. The concluding remarks of the Seasat Failure Review Board, although somewhat lengthy for this article, are informative and pertinent to the on-going conflict between project and functional management over the issue of standards:
“It is ironic, and yet typical, of spacecraft failures that the termination of the Seasat flight was caused not by a malfunction of a new or sophisticated device, but by a failure in a very common component of a type that has flown in many spacecraft for many years. It is also ironic, and instructive, that the smallest of events or the slightest of communications could have prevented the failure. Better clarity in an oral communication, a brief memorandum of the right kind at the right time, a failure report coming to the right person, or an alert engineer could have made all the difference.”
“Basic to the Seasat mission was the concept of using an existing, flight-proven spacecraft bus for the services and housekeeping functions required by the sensors in order to minimize program costs and to permit a concentration of effort on the sensors and their integration into the spacecraft. Thus the use of a “standard Agena bus” as part of the Seasat spacecraft became an enduring tenet of the program. So firmly rooted was this principle in program philosophy that, even after the engineering staff’s of both the Government and the contractor were well aware of the final uniqueness of their Agena bus, the words, and the associated way of doing business, persisted. They became deceived by their own words.”
“Consistent with the concept of the ’standard Agena bus’ was the policy decision to minimize testing and documentation, to qualify components by similarity wherever possible and to minimize the penetration into the Agena bus by the Government. As a result, a test was waived without proper approval, important component failures were not reported to project management, compliance with specifications was weak, and flight controllers were inadequately prepared for their task. Significantly, the Seasat slip ring assembly has no applicable flight history at the time of its launch and, in its application to the spacecraft, was a new device.”
“There can, of course, be no quarrel with the policy of using existing and well proven equipment. The use of such equipment has certainly reduced the costs and contributed to the success of many space missions. But the world of space flight is an unforgiving one and words like ‘standard,’ ‘existing,’ and ‘similar to’ can be traps for the unwary. The technical risks of using ‘standard equipment’ can be as high as those present in a new or untried piece of equipment, but the approach, both technical and managerial, must be different. For new equipment, one designs carefully, reviews thoroughly, and tests completely — and that we know how to do. For ‘standard’ equipment, one should diligently and thoroughly probe the heritage that justifies the classification and identify, component by component and piece by piece, those that are truly ‘standard’ and those that are not. One should assume that each space vehicle is unique until proven otherwise. Then, for those parts that are standard or well proven, and that are applied in the same way, one can forego design reviews, testing and extensive documentation. Conversely, components that are different should be treated as new. The policy of limited penetration into Seasat’s Agena bus by the Government was appropriate, but a limited penetration must be a selective MARCH 1981 penetration and not a reduced effort everywhere.”
“This identification of the heritage of previously used equipment, in both design and application, need not require a large staff or a lot of money. But it does take time, both at the start of the project and at the time of the Critical Design Review. And here, responding to strong desires by all concerned to get the project on contract and underway, the Seasat Project was denied the advantage of an effective Phase B study. Had there been an effective Phase B study period, preliminary designs would have been completed, component selections better understood, test plans and qualification requirements better established, and possibly, the critical role and inherent complexities of the slip ring assembly might have been more apparent to the Seasat engineering staffs. Whether such a Phase B study period would have precluded the Seasat failure is, of course, uncertain for history does not reveal its alternatives. But such a carefully conducted planning and study period would have minimized the chances for the type of failure that did occur.”
“The policy of using existing, flight-proven equipment can be both valid and cost effective. But it is the main lesson of Seasat that an uncritical acceptance of such classifications as ’standard’ can submerge important differences from previously used equipment in both design and in application. It is important, there- 35 fore, that thorough planning be conducted at the start of a project to fully evaluate the heritage of such equipment, to identify those that are standard and those that are not, and to establish project plans and procedures that enable the system to be penetrated in a selective manner.”
Under matrix, ignorance is almost a voluntary misfortune. The risks are high but the opportunities for seeking information, facts and proving respective validity are significant. That is why, the project manager should bear the ultimate responsibility for the success or failure of his/her project.
(h) Individual growth:
Matrixed professionals coming from traditional structures do complain about the unavailability of time and money to go on technical seminars and the loss of training privileges. The day-to-day pressures are so great that self-improvement takes a backburner seat. Performance would suffer sooner or later since work without adequate training is nothing but an immense waste of resources. Under a matrix scheme, it is essential for functional management to retain the responsibility for training and development. In addition to technical seminars about the state of the art of a given technology or a process, there is often much to be gained from refresher or update sessions. In selecting a training program, a balance should be maintained between broadening the individual career aspirations and the job requirements. Furthermore, the skills to perform adequately as a member of a matrix require supplemental training in several areas. These include workshops in objective setting, estimating, scheduling, resource allocation, budgeting, earned value planning and control, progress evaluation, team-building, synergy, conflict management, meeting planning and administration, time management, group problem-solving, leadership, responsibility charting, power sharing, and behavior modification processes. Even if the employee entering the matrix is a business school graduate or has occupied managerial positions in the past, the need still exists for a thorough preparation to produce a fully qualified professional. Indeed, there are good reasons to think that the failure of early matrix experiments is attributable to inadequate preparation, insufficient follow-up and practise. Assumptions and deeply held beliefs must be continually re-examined. Team members need to be brought up to date from time to time with refresher courses to positively reinforce good behaviour and maintain a high performance. Carefully planned annual review sessions could be a richly rewarding experience.
“Well-managed matrix organizations offer the individual a much broader scope, multiple career path options and an opportunity to face challenging decision making situations at a much earlier stage. Learning to work in a matrix contributes to individual growth and fosters interpersonal communications.
While the above factors are also necessary in functional and program organizations, they become even more critical in a matrix set-up. Each matrix organization will ignore these factors at its peril.
6. CONCLUSION
If you are shifting gears to matrix, beware of the consequences. “If you do not really need it, leave it alone. There are easier ways to manage organizations” said Walter Wriston, Chairman of Citibank. This article outlined the prerequisites for matrix, as well as the critical success factors for planning and implementing matrix adequately. It dealt with some neglected design issues. Like most nuclear and space age inventions, matrix is a powerful but a fragile weapon. It is double edged. Matrix will change some organizations but not all, sometimes for the best, sometimes for the worst. It is highly controversial and criticism prone. It has advocates and opponents. Academics are not always careful about the evidence of success of reported cases as they ought to be. But if they are not, management should be. That is why it was worthwhile to convey the “Consumer Beware” warning right from the beginning. Matrix is fragile because the structure is always in a quasi-stationary equilibrium. Like a family, its success is far more dependent on the cooperation and the degree of commitment of all decision makers than any other structure. An organization system is only as good as its weakest link. Just as there are risks in nuclear energy, so there will be risks and mistakes and managerial misuses of the weapons of organizational policy. But such arguments should not prove that matrix should be eshewed. The top management should pay special attention to weaknesses. Mechanisms for building awareness of the fragile equilibrium and maintaining a dynamic stability must be designed to meet the specific requirements of the organization-setting.
It is worthwhile to stress in a form of a final caveat that further applied research about matrix is required. A systematic study of performance achievement is not only a challenge but also a necessity that could positively influence the quality of work and management.
The current survey of scheduling software packages and related programs has been completed and the results of this survey are being published in booklet form. Copies of this survey results booklet can be obtained by contacting PMI at P.O. Box 43, Drexel Hill, PA 19026.
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