Staking a lot on programme and project management

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Conference PaperProgram Management13 October 2009

Harpham, Alan | Kippenberger, Tony

How to cite this article:

Harpham, A., & Kippenberger, T. (2009). Staking a lot on programme and project management. Paper presented at PMI® Global Congress 2009—North America, Orlando, FL. Newtown Square, PA: Project Management Institute.

Over the past decade, the United Kingdom's (UK) government has established important methods for delivering its public services. This paper examines how the UK government developed--under the leadership of British Prime Minister Tony Blair--the management approaches developed as part of its New Labour initiative, also known as the joined-up government. In doing so, it overviews the UK government's pre-New Labour failures in implementing public sector IT projects and its response to such poor performance--creating the UK's Office of Government Commerce (OGC), the authority responsible for developing PRINCE2 and Managing Successful Programmes. It reports New Labour's evolution between 2001 and 2005, noting the government's three focal areas for improvement and its programs for creating public sector best practices. It analyzes some of the public sector programs and projects that failed despite using the government's best efforts, describing how the government addressed its ongoing high-rate of failures. It then

Tony Kippenberger, MBA (Director of the Centre for Strategic Business Studies)

Successful service delivery—across the public sector—has been at the top of the U.K. government's agenda for over a decade, and it turned to improved programme and project management to try to achieve it.

Introduction

Having originally been elected in 1997 on a manifesto that argued the case for improved public services, Tony Blair's “New Labour” government issued a white paper in early 1999 entitled Modernising Government (Cabinet Office, 1999), with a foreword by the British Prime Minister himself. This initiative had three main aims: to ensure that policy-making would be more “joined-up” and strategic (what became known as “joined-up government”); to deliver public services to meet the needs of citizens, not the convenience of service providers; and to deliver public services that would be high-quality and efficient. It was an ambitious plan of reform.

The Same Old Problem

Unfortunately, for all the white paper's brave proposals, everyone was about to be reminded of an old, familiar problem—the repeated failure of government departments to manage large-scale and important projects, especially those involving IT. In the summer of 1999, within just weeks of the white paper's publication, changes and a new IT system at the U.K. Passport Agency went disastrously wrong: a fiasco that played havoc with many people's holiday plans and caused an embarrassing media furor for the government.

This was followed, in January 2000, by a scathing report (Public Accounts Committee, 2000) from the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee (PAC), which reviewed 25 government IT projects that had ran into difficulties in the previous 10 years—most of them wasting many millions of pounds of public money. Another report (Public Accounts Committee, 2001) by the PAC into the Benefits Payment Card Project—a joint project between the U.K.'s Department of Social Security and Post Office Counters Ltd.—found that the project had, by the time it was cancelled in May 1999, already cost the two parties and the taxpayer upwards of £1bn, with nothing to show for it. Not mincing its words, the PAC pointed out that the cancellation “must rank as one of the biggest IT failures in the public sector.”

The Initial Response

Clearly, if Tony Blair's desire to modernise government was to be fulfilled, then something had to be done—including radical changes in the way the U.K. public sector worked. In May 2000 the government responded to the original PAC review with its own report: “Successful IT: Modernising Government in Action” (Cabinet Office, 2000). This contained many recommendations, including, for example, that the future overall responsibility for delivering the business objectives and benefits of any programme or project must be vested in a single, responsible, and visible individual, known as the Senior Responsible Owner (SRO).

In the same year, the Office of Government Commerce (OGC) was set up as an office within the U.K. Treasury, incorporating the old Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency (CCTA). On being established, the OGC was designated as the authority for developing best practices in commercial activity within the government (and, as such, is responsible for PRINCE2™, Managing Successful Programmes [MSP™], the Management of Risk [M_o_R®], and a range of other best practice guidance such as the IT Infrastructure Library [ITIL®]).

By the beginning of 2001 the OGC had formally established a system of Gateway Reviews to monitor the progress and viability of government projects.

A New Mandate to Deliver

In his re-election speech after the 2001 general election, Tony Blair acknowledged that during his second term in office the public would expect to see real improvements in public services. The election result, he declared, “[was] a mandate for reform and for investment in the future and it [was] also very clearly an instruction to deliver” (Blair, 2001).

Immediately after the election, the Prime Minister set up two new units within the Cabinet Office. These were the Prime Minister's Delivery Unit (PMDU)—the Unit's overriding mission was to ensure the delivery of the Prime Minister's top public service priority outcomes for 2001–2005 in education, health, crime prevention, and transport—and the Office for Public Service Reform (OPSR), charged with strengthening the government's reform and modernisation programme.

But the Problems Remain

The civil service's continuing inability to deliver programmes and projects was again highlighted during 2001 by the results coming out of the OGC Gateway Reviews. These indicated that almost three-quarters of the projects being reviewed showed a weakness in identifying the adequate skills and business resources required for the project. These findings were reinforced by audits carried out by the National Audit Office and by the Public Services Productivity Panel's review of how Public Service Agreement targets were being implemented.

In response to Tony Blair's continuing concerns over this apparently endemic weakness a fresh cross-departmental project was proposed to develop a package of measures to achieve significant and sustainable improvement in the successful delivery of government programmes and projects. This new project—called, straightforwardly, Improving Programme and Project Delivery (IPPD)—was given the go-ahead in September 2001.

Recognition at the most senior levels of the British civil service that big improvements in delivery were essential came from Sir Andrew Turnbull on his appointment in June 2002 as head of the Home Civil Service. “By 2005,” he said, “I want to have shaped the civil service into a body that is respected as much for its capability to deliver as for its policy skills” (Turnbull, 2002). This implicitly acknowledged the reality that progress to the senior civil service (grades 1–4) has always been based on policy-making skills and administrative ability—not on implementation. Later that year he captured the new urgency when, in December, he said: “We will continue to improve our performance and capability and complete reforms started in 1999, but the agenda is now more ambitious and the pace of reform more urgent. Our single strategic aim will be to transform public services as quickly as possible” (Turnbull, 2002).

Improving Programme and Project Delivery

The IPPD project team completed its work in December 2002 and it was launched in February 2003. At the time, Tony Blair said in his Forward that: “Improving public services is the Government's top priority. Achieving this requires clear leadership from the top and better delivery on the ground. Better programme and project management (PPM) in the Civil Service has a key role to play in meeting this challenge” (Office of Public Services Reform, 2003).

The IPPD's recommendations focused on three main areas:

  • •      A changed structure and culture—to support senior management in implementing a programme management approach to delivery, through developing a “Centre of Excellence” (CoE) in each department. Indicating the level of urgency, June 2003 was set as a deadline for establishing CoEs in every government department, each with a remit to include their agencies and non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs).
  • •      New processes and toolkits—a web-based PPM framework—“Policy to Successful Delivery”—for use by non-specialists that was scalable to degrees of risk and complexity.
  • •      People and skills—a set of products for departments to assess, develop, deploy, recruit, and reward staff with PPM skills for specific delivery roles.

CoEs

The OGC had a highly ambitious target to achieve a two-to threefold improvement in the success of central government projects by June 2006. So, in line with the IPPD report, it set about helping departments to establish CoEs, including the use of OGC-accredited consultants to help the process. These CoEs were much more than programme offices, because their responsibility was to provide a continuous strategic overview across their department's entire portfolio of programmes—not just coordinating and reporting on the programmes, but actually challenging what must be delivered and how it will be delivered.

Although CoEs were initially installed across government, the emphasis on them has now passed, though most departments still have a CoE or a Programme/Project Support Office. OGC has subsequently developed Best Practice Guidance for Portfolio, Programme and Project Support Offices (P3O) in 2008.

Successful Delivery Skills (SDS) Programme

A Successful Delivery Skills (SDS) programme, set up in 2002, was originally designed to offer practitioners and others involved in the delivery of major, novel, or complex projects the opportunity to widen and improve their skills. However, the take-up of SDS training with the contracted trainer was lower than expected and the trainer subsequently terminated its contract.

The PPM Specialism

At the APM Group's Best Practice Showcase in June 2003, Sir Peter Gershon announced another OGC initiative—the creation of a PPM Specialism. The aim of the PPM Specialism was to create and develop a specialist cadre of civil servants with PPM expertise.

This was a joint initiative between the OGC and the Cabinet Office Corporate Development Group. The PPM Specialism was linked with the CoE initiative previously outlined. However, by mid 2006, the OGC website devoted to the PPM Specialism had been closed and the initiative in its original form was clearly over.

A Change of Emphasis

In April 2003, John Oughton was appointed Deputy Chief Executive of OGC under Peter Gershon. Oughton was a procurement specialist and had previously been director of procurement policy in the U.K.'s Ministry of Defence (MoD).

In April 2004, Gershon left OGC to return to the private sector and Oughton took over as Chief Executive. At about the same time, with an eye to a General Election in 2005, Gordon Brown, then the Chancellor of the Exchequer, suddenly announced his plans to slash government costs, through procurement and efficiency gains, by £20bn and to lose 40,000 jobs in the civil service over the following few years. The savings plans he announced were based on the recommendations made by Gershon, whilst head of the OGC, in a review of government spending and efficiency, entitled “Releasing Resources to the Front Line” (Gershon, 2004), commissioned by Brown in August 2003.

As a result, the OGC's priorities were re-focused. Initially, it had three priorities. It had to work with government departments to improve public services and to help them meet their efficiency new targets by 2007/08. It was also designated to work as a catalyst to achieve the best value for money in the government's commercial activities. A Value for Money (VfM) target of £7bn was set, to be achieved by 2007/08, through savings in central government civil procurement, through improvements in the success rate of programmes and projects, and through other commercial initiatives.

Meanwhile, the OGC also had the lead role in engaging with and reporting on the success of what were termed the government's “mission critical projects.” This portfolio of 120 projects included a “top 20” that attracted the personal interest of Tony Blair.

But there seemed little doubt that PPM was now taking a back seat among OGC priorities.

So, Had the PPM Emphasis Worked?

Certainly to the public there was little evidence that Sir Andrew (now Lord) Turnbull's ambition, that the civil service be recognized for its capability to deliver, would achieved by the end of 2005. The problem with change—and especially cultural change of this nature—is that it takes time to achieve. The OGC and Lord Turnbull certainly tried dragging the horse to water, but did it drink?

Of course, it was difficult to judge whether there had been a two-to threefold improvement in the success of central government projects. It seems that while awareness of programme and project management, and the need to deliver, has increased, there were fundamental cultural problems that still got in the way. Not least is the frequent movement of civil servants within government departments, which led to changes in the composition of programme and project teams and the consequent difficulty in holding people responsible for what happens.

What was certain was that things still went wrong. In late 2004, the head of the Child Support Agency, Doug Smith, resigned after a new £450 million IT system proved to be a disastrous failure, with the National Audit Office (NAO) concluding that the Agency in its current state was not fit for purpose. In March 2004, the NAO had produced a report on OGC and its Gateway Review process. It examined 440 Gateway reviews in more than 250 IT projects and found that although many projects had improved as a result of the OGC reviews: “The concerns raised in Gateway reviews have remained broadly the same since their introduction in 2001” (National Audit Office, 2004).

NAO pointed out apparently “intractable issues,” including poor project management skills, lack of communication with stakeholders, and inadequate risk management. “This evidence could suggest that the OGC has not been successful in achieving the widespread dissemination of best practice in these areas. Alternatively, however, it could demonstrate the challenge of applying this best practice to large and complex projects” (National Audit Office, 2004).

Other Developments

In May 2005, Tony Blair won a third election victory but, although he had originally pledged to serve a full third term, he was destined to be eased from office by backbench pressure in 2007.

Meanwhile, in a new, broader initiative, the Cabinet Office began a Professional Skills for Government (PSG) programme to ensure that that all civil servants have the right blend of professional and business skills to deliver public services and that they had access to development opportunities that support career progression to senior positions.

Implementation began in late 2005 and it was seen as a major, long-term change programme designed to ensure that civil servants, wherever they work, have the right mix of skills and expertise to enable their departments or agencies to deliver effective services.

There are four areas: leadership, core skills, job-related professional skills, and skills gained through broader experience. The core skills included people management, financial management, analysis and use of evidence, strategic thinking, marketing and communications, and, significantly, PPM. So PPM was identified as a core skill along with the others.

In August 2005, Lord Turnbull's successor as Cabinet Secretary, Sir Gus O'Donnell, took over. His mantra was “pride and passion, professionalism and pace” (O'Donnell, 2006), and he certainly moved quickly, replacing 12 of the 17 permanent secretaries that head up government departments in his first few months. He also introduced “Capability Reviews” of government departments to ensure that each was flexible enough and has the right skills.

He was candid about what was needed. “The case for change on a transformational scale is clear. So it is vital that we move forward with vigour and passion… My objective is to create a culture of excellence, raising standards of all to those of the best” (O'Donnell, 2006). He also saw the need for professional skills, including PPM: “For our part, we must make sure that the people we employ have deeply embedded professional skills. The Professional Skills for Government agenda is the key to our strategy here” (O'Donnell).

Back at OGC

Meanwhile, at OGC, John Oughton was pushing ahead with his procurement review and working to achieve the targets set by Gordon Brown. But, with the publication of “Transforming Government Procurement” (HM Treasury, 2007) on 23 January 2007, John Oughton announced that he would stand down as Chief Executive of the OGC on 31 March. Pleased to have met his targets in his three years as OGC's chief executive, he said: “As I informed the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury last year, the completion of the OGC review is the right time to appoint a new Chief Executive, able to serve a full term while implementing the Transforming Government Procurement agenda” (Oughton, 2007). However, the Treasury appears to have been caught unaware because it was necessary to appoint his deputy, Peter Fanning, as acting CEO until a replacement could be found.

At the same time, it was announced that the OGC would be reduced in size by about half, and its remit shortened to cover just central government rather than the whole public sector. In addition, it would hand over the running of the government's efficiency programme to that department.

Despite this, the OGC would assume more power in the areas where it retained a role. It would become more interventionist. Whereas in the past OGC could identity, suggest, and recommend, it couldn't go into a department and tell them what to do. That was to change, with OGC able to say what was wrong and tell departments how to do things better.

Among the changes would be the establishment of a Major Project Review Group to provide an “enhanced Gateway review process” (HM Treasury, 2007). It would have the power to tell departments how to handle major projects. The group would look at mission critical deals—the programmes and projects that couldn't be allowed to go wrong.

In June 2007, Nigel Smith was appointed the new Chief Executive of OGC and, in the same month, Gordon Brown finally became Prime Minister.

A Renewed Emphasis on PPM

Having shed its main role in running the efficiency programme, OGC has six main objectives. It continues its work on VfM through improved procurement; it runs the Major Project Review Group (focused on the top 40 projects—such as the U.K.'s new super aircraft carriers and the 2012 Olympics); it is working to improve the use of the (£800bn) Government Estate through better property asset management; it is endeavoring to improve sustainability in both government procurement and operations; it takes the lead across Government on public procurement policy and standards; and it plays a key role in improving capability in procurement and PPM.

In the latter role, a PPM Skills and Capability Initiative was launched in 2008. It is a cross-Government community effort, facilitated and coordinated by a central support unit for the profession within OGC. Its ultimate aim is to improve Government's ability to successfully deliver its projects and programmes, through improving the professional PPM skills of individuals working within Central Government.

A PPM Council has been established, chaired by Nigel Smith who asked the Permanent Secretaries of 18 Departments and the three devolved administrations (Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland) to nominate Board Champions and Heads of Profession for PPM. The Heads of Profession now form the PPM Council, which meets four times a year. The Council agrees strategy for developing PPM capability across Government. Board Champions have an internal sponsorship role for PPM within their organizations and Nigel Smith meets with them more informally. This established governance for the Government PPM Profession for the first time.

The PPM leadership community includes Heads of Centres of Excellence, Heads of PPM Skills, and Heads of Corporate Programme Offices or PPM Support Units (as applicable). The community is supported by three working subgroups focused on developing a skills and capability infrastructure (Careers); establishing communication channels and messages for PPM practitioners (Membership); and identifying and sharing best practice (Standards). These groups all met six times in 2008/09.

The PPM leadership community proposed a first set of recommended standards in PPM methodology and professional memberships, which were endorsed by the PPM Council at its second meeting in March 2009. The Careers Group has also developed and published a directory of Learning and Development opportunities relevant to people working in PPM roles. For the future, there are two fundamental pieces of work being carried out by the Careers and Membership Groups during summer 2009 that will support all other initiatives, namely the definition of the Government PPM Community and development of a PPM competence assessment tool.

One of the challenges facing the PPM community is the assessment of PPM skills and competence for both career and resource planning—making sure that the best people are managing the U.K. government's most significant programmes and projects. In order to support both cross-government working and the mobility of PPM professionals, there needs to a standard approach to assessing the PPM competence of individuals. The Careers Group is currently discussing the way forwards on an assessment model and has agreed a number of key principles that will guide any decisions made. One of these principles is the acceptance of the Association for Project Management (APM) competence framework as the industry standard.

But Failures Continue …

Last year it was admitted that a £7bn Ministry of Defence programme for a new computer system (Defence Information Infrastructure) was running 18 months late and was set to exceed its budget by £182m, according to the National Audit Office (National Audit Office, 2008).

The FireControl project, based on closing all 46 emergency fire control rooms used by the Fire Service in England and moving to just nine regional centers, was originally estimated to cost £100 million when it was first proposed. The government said it would use “tried and tested” technology, make massive savings, and would be fully operational by November 2007. It is currently running three years late and is estimated to be £1.5bn over budget (BAPCO Journal, 2008).

Meanwhile, the U.K.'s National Programme for IT (NPfIT)—apparently the largest civilian IT programme in the world continues to cause concern. Originally budgeted at £2.3bn over three years, it is estimated to be likely to cost £12.6bn over ten years. The 2009 Public Accounts Committee report noted that the NPfIT had provided “little clinical functionality … to-date” and the roll out of the core component in the system—the Care Record Service—is currently running at least four years behind schedule (Public Accounts Committee, 2009).

So, things still go wrong. But, because success is not usually trumpeted as readily as failures are decried, it seems likely that the introduction of procedures (like the Gateway Review process and the Major Projects Group), the raising of the profile of PPM as a set of identifiable skills and capabilities and its ranking as a “profession” within the civil service, together with OGC's development and maintenance of its Best Management Practice portfolio including PRINCE2, MSP, M_o_R, and ITIL must have made a difference. As Janice Thomas and Mark Mullaly (2008) found when undertaking the research for PMI into the “Value of Project Management,” identifying tangible value from PPM is difficult and rarely undertaken. So we have to hope that there are significant intangible benefits across government, such as improvements in decision-making; enhanced communications and collaboration; improvements in effective working; alignment of approaches, terminology, and values within the civil service; overall effectiveness of departments and their management processes; and improved transparency, clarity of structures, roles, and responsibilities.

The Wider Benefits

In the meantime, the wider PPM community should welcome this entire endeavor because of the real recognition of the importance and value of PPM that all this implies. How many private sector organizations take PPM as seriously?

In concluding we should add that, in this process, the development by the OGC of Best Practice Guidance in the field of programme, project, and risk management is following the pattern set by its predecessor, the CCTA. The CCTA developed the ITIL Best Practice Guides that have become a worldwide standard for service management in IT. The OGC's Best Practice Guides, all of which have been thoroughly revised over the last two years, form the basis for examinations in PRINCE2, Managing Successful Programmes (MSP), Management of Risk (M_o_R), and Portfolio, Programme and Project offices (P3O), and the APM Group (APMG) certifies Accredited Training Organisations (ATOs) and Approved Trainers for these guides. The significance of these best practice processes is reflected in the following facts:

  • There are now 155 ATOs—71 based in the UK, 27 in the Netherlands, 20 in Australia, six in Denmark, five in both China and Germany, four in South Africa, three in Poland, and two each in Belgium, Singapore, and the USA, and one in each of France, the United Arab Emirates, Switzerland, Italy, Malaysia, Norway, Romania, and Switzerland.
  • 51 also offer training for MSP
  • 20 also offer training for M_o_R
  • There are over 600 approved trainers worldwide.

A further measure of PRINCE2's growing reputation is that last year more than 90,000 people took the PRINCE2 Foundation or Practitioner Examinations run by APMG. Currently, around 3,000 participants take one or other of these exams each week. And most significantly, apart from the U.K., participants have now sat PRINCE2 exams in over 100 countries.

Whether or not the U.K. government achieves its objectives, the worldwide PPM community has already benefited from its endeavors!

References

BAPCO Journal. (October, 2008). Fire Brigade Union hits out over FireControl project. Available at http://www.bapcojournal.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/1295/Fire_Brigade_Union_hits_out_over_FireControl_project.html

Blair, T. (June, 2001). Speech. Guardian newspaper website: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2001/jun/08/election2001.electionspast1

Cabinet Office. (March, 1999). Modernising government. Norwich UK, TSO.

Cabinet Office. (May, 2000). Successful IT: Modernising Government in Action. Cabinet Office archive website: http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/e-envoy/reports-top/$file/successfulit_menu.htm

Gershon, P. (July, 2004). Releasing resources to the front line. HM Treasury website: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/efficiency_review120704.pdf

HM Treasury. (January, 2007). Transforming government procurement. HM Treasury website: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/government_procurement_pu147.pdf

National Audit Office. (March, 2004). Improving procurement: Progress by the Office of Government Commerce in improving departments capability to procure cost. National Audit Office website: http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0304/improving_procurement.aspx?alreadysearchfor=yes

National Audit Office. (July, 2008). Ministry of Defence: The Defence Information Infrastructure. National Audit Office website: www.nao.org.uk/publications/nao_reports/07–08/0708788.pdf

O'Donnell, G. (June, 2006). Speech. Cabinet Office newsroom website: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/newsroom/news_releases/2006/060606_code.aspx and full text at National School of Government website: http://www.nationalschool.gov.uk/news_events/psrc2006/downloads/speech_gus_odonnell.pdf

Office of Public Services Reform. (February, 2003). Improving Programme and Project Delivery. Cabinet Office archive website: http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/opsr/documents/pdf/ippdfinal03.pdf

Oughton, J. (January, 2007). Press release. HM Treasury website: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_13_07.htm

Public Accounts Committee, House of Commons. (January, 2000). First Report, Improving the delivery of Government IT projects, Norwich UK, TSO.

Public Accounts Committee, House of Commons, (December, 2001) Third Report, (Benefits Payment Card Project) Norwich UK, TSO. UK Parliament website: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmpubacc/358/35802.htm

Public Accounts Committee. (January, 2009). The National Programme for IT in the NHS: Progress since 2006. UK Parliament website: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmpubacc/153/153.pdf

Thomas, J., & Mullaly, M. (July, 2008). Researching the value of project management. PMI, Warsaw, Poland.

Turnbull, A. (June, 2002). Speech. Civil Service archive: http://www.civilservant.org.uk/turnbull0902.pdf, UK Parliament website: http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2005/rp05–092.pdf (page 29).

Turnbull, A. (December, 2002). Speech. Cabinet Office archive website: http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/opsr/documents/pdf/sat_statement_06_12_02.pdf

© 2009, Alan Harpham & Tony Kippenberger
Originally published as a part of 2009 PMI Global Congress Proceedings – Orlando, Florida

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