Understanding relationship based procurement in the construction sector
summary of research findings
RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia
Beverley M. Lloyd-Walker
Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia
This paper presents a summary of core findings from recent research funded by the Project Management Institute (PMI) with assistance from a parallel complimentary study undertaken with Australian Research Council (ARC) funding investigating innovation and project alliances in Australia. The purpose of this paper is to present a model and a framework that helps us better understand the nuances of various forms of project and program procurement in the construction sector through visualizing elements that shape the form of a project procurement approach then being able to measure these against the provided framework.
The research approach and a table of sources are presented to indicate the depth of rigor applied in the study. This includes but is not limited to semi-structured interviews with 50 subject matter experts and analysis of over 500 pages of interview transcripts using NVivo 10 as a tool to aid sensemaking of the data. The value of this paper, and the research work it reports upon, is that it extends our knowledge of project procurement forms and helps develop a theory of project procurement choice making.
Practical value delivered by this paper includes presentation of a visualization tool for understanding project procurement forms so that, as they evolve over time and are interpreted across the world, a more explicit and clearer explanation of how they fit into a relationship-based procurement continuum might be used. This should help academics, practitioners, and policy makers become more confident that they are “speaking the same language.”
Keywords: project procurement; value, collaboration
The term relationship-based procurement (RBP) has come to mean many things to many people around the world with little stable agreement about what it means at any given time (Walker & Lloyd-Walker, 2014b). One thing that is clear about the RBP concept is that it refers to developing a project delivery mechanism that holds collaboration and joint problem solving as central features (Macneil, 2000); however, the mechanism to do this varies globally to a considerable degree. Lahdenperä (2012) provides a useful summary of the global development of RBP forms and, in particular, project alliances. Alliancing, at the project and program level, can be contrasted with transactional project procurement approaches. In traditional transactional project procurement arrangements, project development is scoped and a brief is developed, then there is a design phase followed by a tender phase. The project owner expects that the design developed from the project brief is delivered with little further project owner involvement in a linear fashion seeking open market bids to deliver the project with each party having a legitimate right to maximize their return on investment and effort (Martynov, 2009; Department of Infrastructure and Transport, 2011). RBP can be seen as a part of a procurement approach continuum in the construction sector. Towards one end we see the more traditional design, bid, build or design and construct (D&C) project procurement form, with partnering agreements (Masterman, 2002), project alliances (Walker & Lloyd-Walker, 2014a), fully integrated project delivery (American Institute of Architects - AIA California Council, 2007; Ashcraft, 2010), and the British Airports Authority’s Terminal 5 style of agreement (Brady & Davies, 2010) form at the other end of the continuum.
The continuum concept of visualizing RBP is somewhat useful but there has been a gap in our understanding of the nuances of these forms (Gil, 2009). What is needed is a visualization tool or framework by which we can attribute meaning to various terms. This kind of tool could help us map nuances of different forms, as well as map how concepts and terms evolve over time. This paper reports on research that has developed such a tool and presents the model and framework.
|3BL||Triple bottom line of performance being financial, environmental, and social|
|BOOT||Build own operate transfer family of project types|
|D&C||Design and construct|
|DC/P||Delivery consortia/delivery partner|
|ECI||Early contractor involvement|
|IPD||Integrated project delivery|
|KPI||Key performance indicator|
|KRA||Key results area|
|KSAE||Knowledge, skills, attributes, and experience|
|NOP||Non-owner participants in an alliance|
|PFI||Public Finance Initiative|
|POR||Project owner representative in an alliance|
|PPP||Public private partnerships|
|Proj. Pntrg.||Project partnering|
|RBP||Relationship based procurement|
|SCM||Supply chain management|
|T5||Terminal five, Heathrow London procurement form|
|TOC||Target outturn cost|
Brief Outline of RBP Forms
Before explaining the research approach, we should explain our understanding from the literature and common parlance of a range of terms used to describe various project procurement forms. Macneil (2000) points out that all contracts involve a relationship to some extent. The relationship can be basically transactional, in which the client (in this papers’ term the project owner) has a hands-off relationship with the product’s deliverer (the project design and delivery team), or it can be more hands-on and collaborative where the project owner and the project delivery team collaborate to interpret requirements and how to deliver the project. We focus in this paper on RBP forms in which the project owner has greater levels of hands-on involvement with the project delivery team than a purely design, bid, build approach in which what is expressly specified is delivered subject to changes for minor amendments to the design brief. While we focus on the construction sector, we acknowledge that this is also relevant to other project delivery sectors such as engineered products and services, information technology, and perhaps even extending to intangible delivery projects such as business process change and events projects.
Table 1 provides a brief summary of procurement forms that involve a degree of RBP, ranging from integrated design and delivery (construction) to project alliancing.
Table 1: RBP forms (adapted from Walker & Lloyd-Walker, 2014b).
|RBP Form Name Tag||Relationship Characteristics|
|Design and construct (D&C)||D&C is integrated in a single contract between the project owner (PO) or its representative (POR) and the project delivery entity, which may have an in-house or outsourced design team and a project delivery production team. Collaboration between design and delivery team members at an early stage would occur in developing the D&C bid but the intensity and quality varies.|
|Integrated supply chain management (SCM)||This may range from a contractor, acting independently of the PO/POR, managing its supply chain through purposeful and tiered arrangements to minimize the number of parties in the supply chain, to an integrated PO/POR and contractor SCM approach similar to that discussed earlier in the way that British Airports developed the T5 Agreement.|
|Management Contracting (MC)||The MC entity may have an agency (fee based) contract or a direct (profit) contract with the PO. In either case, the work packages are undertaken directly under the PO (for agency MC) or the head contractor (for profit MC). The main feature of MC is early contractor involvement (ECI) on advice about logistics, project methods, and other technical issues that helps to develop a more ‘buildable’ solution. The relationship between POR and MC is usually close and collaborative.|
|Joint venture (JV) consortia||This is very similar to a traditional design-bid-build project except that the head contractor of the project delivery team will form a contractual arrangement with other contractor(s) to be able to cover all technical, cultural, or other needs of the project. The JV may operate in a variety of ways depending on how well disposed each party is towards building and maintaining relationships.|
|Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT) family of project types, Public Private Partnerships (PPP) and Public Finance Initiative (PFI)||There is an intense involvement of various parties to the project delivery team but with little involvement of the POR at the early stages beyond acting to clarify any questions and issues and ambiguities presented by the project brief. The project is also in this case a very long term one in that the entity that ‘owns’ the project has possession of it until it is transferred to the commissioning client. Thus, the BOOT/PPP/PFI entity can be considered the PO in one sense.|
|Project partnering (Proj. Pntrg.)||A partnering agreement is established as a form of relational compact rather than contract in that is somewhat volunteered. This compact provides a charter that helps to establish vision, mission and objectives, behavioral expectations, and a dispute and issue resolution protocol. It is largely a cultural artifact. It is still possible for the relationship of various parties to break down resulting in litigation and there are few if any formal mechanisms to force parties to collaborate. Partnering may include the PO/POR and design/delivery team or may be confined to the project delivery team participants.|
|Strategic partnering (Strat. Pntrg.)||Strategic partnering is an extension of project partnering across a program of work comprising many projects over an extended timeframe. The partners may be a client and contractor, and perhaps including selected subcontractors and suppliers, so that a set of protocols are agreed (similar to the above) that may include incentive payments, guaranteed profit margin subjected to open-book scrutiny, and other relational arrangements that build trust and transparency.|
|Integrated solutions – competitive dialogue (CD)||This is a protocol that is used at the pre-tendering stage to canvass opportunities for a CD and during the tendering stage where the PO/POR and potential contractors have an open discussion about developing a solution in a way that each better understand the other’s perspectives, strengths, and weaknesses. This allows for wider exploration of options and incentives and improved measures of performance with which to negotiate terms.|
|Integrated project delivery (IDP)||This RBP form evolved out of the Lean Production and Lean Construction concepts (Ballard, 2008). In its manifestation of IDP emphasis on waste reduction, rework, and production efficiency have been enhanced to include a focus on relational integration, incentives for collaboration, and a behavioral element to bind parties to an explicit set of behavioral protocols (AIA, 2007; Ashcraft, 2010; Cohen, 2010).|
|Alliancing (Project, Program, Service or Design Alliance) and Delivery Consortia and Delivery Partner DC/P||This RBP form can be understood as a highly evolved form of partnering and further advanced form of IPD. It also shares characteristics of SCM, but often not as advanced as the Heathrow Airport T5 Agreement form. |
What principally distinguishes the alliance from partnering and IDP is that it has structured, well-articulated, and well-understood contractual commitments, based on a commercial contract that stipulates how the work to be done will be parceled up and how it will be paid for. An incentive contract that explicitly states gainsharing and painsharing arrangements, explicitly defines KPIs and KRAs and how they will be measured and assessed, and most definingly in terms of other forms, there is a behavioral contract that explicitly states the nature of the party’s behavior with a no-blame and no-litigation agreement. This is undertaken with explicit protocols for governance and transparency with an open-book approach.
Service alliances and program alliances are interesting in that they are like partnering alliances but again with greater formality and specificity of expectations both commercially and behaviorally. Other emerging alliance forms such as design alliances are formed at the pre-tender stage of projects to draw in expertise (similar to Agency MC) and to help develop project procurement delivery strategy.
Experience based on the T5 form of delivery led to two related forms of procurement, the Delivery Consortia and Delivery Partner (DC/P) approach. Her Majesty’s Treasury in the UK refer to Delivery Consortia (2003, p. 29) in the follow terms “The Delivery Consortia approach is adopted in sectors such as the regulated utilities where clients seek to transfer high value performance based contracts to a 1st tier organization over the course of a regulatory control period. Under the contract the supplier undertakes the design of the projects from solution development stage against an output specification. The supplier also provides program management services alongside a design and build capability.”
|Early contract involvement (ECI)||This is more of a general term that encompasses many features of MC with design alliances and other interfaces over the project life cycle. A principal feature of collaboration between the PO/POR, design team, and ECI project delivery consultant is based in being engaging in constructability or buildability consulting based on a negotiated fee basis.|
|Framework agreements (FA)||Framework agreements are similar to strategic partnering or service alliances in many respects but are used broadly for design services, construction and project delivery services, as well as for maintenance and facilities management. They are similar to these in that a key set of protocols, selection criteria, performance criteria, etc. are established as a framework to apply over an extended time period but unlike strategic partnering or service alliances, which appear to be generally continuous as a form of insourcing resources and expertise, they enable a pool of providers to be available on demand as and when required.|
The above RBP forms provide a broad framework for understanding the degree of collaboration and some of the expected features and characteristics. The research study used these to benchmark features and properties of the relationship.
A study was funded by PMI to undertake a thorough literature review, collection of data about case studies and to undertake a global set of interviews using a semi-structured interview instrument with which to gather data from subject matter experts about features and characteristics of various forms of RBP adopted across the globe but mainly focused on Europe, North America, and Australasia. The authors also used insights gained from a number of previous studies that they had undertaken in this area stretching back over 12 years. The idea was to gain a comprehensive and rigorous picture of the ’state of the art’ in RBP as of the end of 2013. We then used NVivo10 as a sensemaking tool and an analytical framework that we will explain in more detail shortly. We present a summary of our research sources in Table 2.
Table 2: Research sources.
|Source||Details||Rationale and Notes|
|Textbooks||Well-established texts on project procurement (Rowlinson & McDermott, 1999; Masterman, 2002; Winch, 2003; Walker & Rowlinson, 2008)||These texts represent the most authoritative standard texts for procurement within the construction industry context.|
|Previous studies||Study of the National Museum of Australia (Walker & Hampson, 2003) |
The study on profiling professional excellence in project alliances (Walker & Lloyd-Walker, 2011)
A European context study conducted by the Manchester Business School (Manchester Business School, 2009)
A study of the IPD approach in the USA (Cohen, 2010)
|This was a well-documented longitudinal study of a project alliance. |
This study was based on in-depth interviews with 10 alliance managers, three supervisors of alliance managers, and findings validated by nine other experts.
This gave a solid European context for the study across the European continent.
This provided a solid U.S. context to the study.
|Review of PhDs in the area||Several doctorates in this area, several of which were supervised by one of this paper’s authors.||These expanded the insights and value of analysis through both cutting-edge theory and empirical study to draw upon.|
|Journal papers||Too many to list here, but included papers on all procurement forms with a focus on many papers relating to partnering, IPD, the T5 approach, as well as alliancing in several country contexts.||There is a growing body of papers that provide reports on case studies, surveys as well as conceptual and theory building papers.|
|This survey||14 leading academics; 36 expert senior practitioners; approximately 50+ hours of transcribed interviews; 500+ pages of transcript||We chose academics from Australia, the UK, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, and the USA with proven publication expertise in the area. Our practitioner interviews were conducted with a range of subject matter experts with extensive knowledge of a range of RBP forms, and most had experience with the high end of the RBP continuum.|
Table 2 provides a summary only. Interested readers should refer to Walker and Lloyd-Walker (2014b) for a fuller description of the research approach and data sources.
Table 2, in part, conveys the depth of research undertaken. We drew upon a significant body of empirical research undertaken in Europe, North America, and Australasia, using textbooks, doctoral theses based on quantitative data and on qualitative data, and journal papers based on previous research studies in this area.
Foundational data for this study was based on semi-structured interviews with experts in the field. Academics were asked to reflect on their research work in this area. They discussed their reflections on their publications, what was omitted from their publications due to word count limitations, what had changed since publication, and what was currently being written or in the review and publication process. Practitioners were asked to reflect on project procurement choices that they had direct and deep experience of. They discussed strategic choices that led to that procurement form, their reflections on the effectiveness of the choice given strategic reasons for making the choice and implications of the way the project was delivered. They reflected upon how they felt the projects and programs of projects would have been delivered if different procurement choices had been made, whether these may have resulted in better or less successful outcomes, and why this might be so. They also provided reflections on within and between project team relationships, degree of innovation encouraged by the procurement form, and participant trust and commitment with respect to the project as influenced by the governance structures and procurement form.
We argue that this provides a rich and deep basis with which to develop the model and framework presented in this paper.
Theoretical Framework for Analysis
Nyström (2005) developed a useful model for making sense of complex organizational arrangements where project team elements and features are classified into recognizable components that can describe a “system” or way of working. He applied the German philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblance to project partnering by emphasizing the general components of partnering. Wittgenstein had argued “(…) that complicated concepts cannot be defined in the traditional way by stating necessary and sufficient conditions. There might not be a single or a small number of features, which are common for all variants of a term and therefore it cannot be defined in the traditional way” (Nyström, 2005, p. 474). Nyström then proceeded to argue that there are complex networks of overlapping similarities among the things that fall under a complex concept. Thus, it was valid to use Wittgenstein’s family resemblance model in which core attributes or characteristics are surrounded by familiar components that are crystallized from analysis of family resemblances.
Instead of “family” traits being a particular shaped nose, familiar gait, speech pattern, or other form of attribute that typifies somebody as likely to belong to a particular family tree, Nyström clumped attributes of partnering. This was designed to enable him to analyze the partnering literature and case study data to construct a “flower” analogy with a core, ever-present component and “petals” that represent other components that may be present, have been discarded, or that have not been fully developed. We see flowers with a variety of petal arrangements, yet the genus is usually easily recognizable even if many petals are missing. Yeung, Chan, and Chan (2007) used the same logic to study components of project alliances to understand what is specific about alliancing, with a focus on the hard (contractual) and soft (relationship-based) elements. We adapt this approach to present our summary analysis of RBP approaches drawn from the literature, analysis of interview data from participants, and reflection on our previous and current research data. This model forms an RBP taxonomy in the sense of the Greek derivation of taxonomy as meaning “arrangement.”
The approach we adopted in developing a model was to gather data and make sense of it to be able to refine and distill a discrete set of factors that could be illustrated as “petals” in a Wittgenstein-style model. Our form of Wittgenstein’s family resemblance model concept is illustrated in Figure 1 and can be used as an RBP taxonomy. We grouped the “petals” into three broad categories to aid visualization and understanding of the number of elements or “petals” identified. We drew upon and adapted ideas proposed by Jacobsson and Roth (2014), who conceptualized partnering as a series of engagement platforms that explain how the relationship is structurally and logically based, enabled, and the behaviors that sustain it are explained through what they describe as means, foundations, and factors.
Figure 1: RBP Taxonomy (source: Walker & Lloyd-Walker, 2014b).
The central core in the RBP Taxonomy model in Figure 1, the “stamen” of the flower, illustrates the project delivery components. This is surrounded by three clumps of element consisting of “petals,” Our model illustrates 16 petals that can be used to explain the different forms of RBP. Each RBP form has different characteristics of each petal that fall within a general family resemblance and when visualized holistically, they can help us identify more specific classes of RBP forms and help us to better anticipate expectations of the various parties to that procurement arrangement.
The delivery component of the project is situated at the core of our model. Delivery success is defined by key result areas (KRAs) of performance that are measured by key performance indicators (KPIs). KRAs extend beyond traditional cost, time, and fitness for purpose constraints for RBP forms. They depend on the identified benefits and KRA set that the project is designed to deliver. For water projects this may include guaranteed availability of water at a specified potable quality, and for transport projects this may include minimum disruption to existing services. Differences in the extent and order of collaborative arrangements reflect the extent and manner to which overhead and profit are incentivized. The direct delivery cost component includes direct project specific cost elements such as material, labor, and supply chain input components from suppliers and contractors. The project delivery team’s overhead and profit is added to this to form the target outturn cost (TOC). For project alliances in particular, the profit contribution is kept as a separate and discrete “at-risk” fee for service that becomes subject to a painshare/gainshare agreement. The agreement specifies the percentage risk and reward ratio for each participant in the agreement. The project is also agreed to be delivered by a set time deadline. Agreed KPIs are used for measuring performance that influence the final quantum and proportion of the painshare or gainshare at-risk fee for service to be distributed to participants. Surrounding the delivery components core are the 16 “petals” grouped within three clusters or groups of linked factors.
At the base of the model in Figure 1 are four platform foundational facilities that provide infrastructure elements that determine how the RBP form will operate. A core psychological foundational element, indicated in red, represents the defining motivations and contextual circumstances that shape the logic of the adopted collaborative approach. That base platform element supports the five behavior-shaping factors on the left-hand side of the model that drive normative practices. These practices define the ambience, the workplace cultural sense, and the feeling experienced by those engaged in the project (for more details on the term ambience refer to Walker & Lloyd-Walker, 2014a). These behavioral factors drive six processes, routines, and means factors, situated on the right-hand side of the model, that shape how the RBP form will respond to the platform foundational facility factors.
Figure 1 thus illustrates the “petals” that represent other components that may be present, or have been discarded, or perhaps never fully developed for various forms of RBP. These change as the various labelled RBP forms change over time and as a result of cultural, geographic, historical, and other contextual influences. We generally label these platform facilities, and behavioral and process drivers.
We are now in a position to describe in more depth the other elements of Figure 1 and their sub-elements. Platform foundational facilities comprise the integrating features for collaboration. These are explained in Table 2, behavioral factors are explained in Table 3, and the processes, routines, and means are explained in Table 4.
Appendix 1, Tables 3, 4, and 5 share a common fomat. The first column contains the main theme, “petal” factors. For example, the motivation and context of the circumstances impacting the precurement choice is presented in Appendix 1 Table 3 as element and theme 1. In the next column we present the sub-themes within each element and provide a summary description of that sub-theme. For example, in Appendix 1 Table 3, “Best value—motivational focus is based on value not cost. Value is expressed in KRAs and KPIs that link to the project purpose. Often 3BL issues are of high priority in such cases.” The term 3BL refers to triple bottom line, the financial, social, and environmental performance measures. The third column contains a suggested measurement scale for the element/theme in general. The scale is fairly coarse-grained, ranging from low to high. It can be evaluated using an approximation to the descriptor provided for low or high. For example, in Appendix 1 Table 3, we suggest low and high as:
- Low levels would be related to a hostile environment for collaboration. This may be due to lack of conviction of parties in the value of collaboration within this project’s context.
- High levels would relate to the procurement choice solution being driven by the acceptance of the logic of a clear advantage being gained by adopting a focus on a supportive and collaborative approach to delivering benefits that align with the values of participants.
The closeness to this description can determine whether the attributed value for that element should be low, medium, or high. We suggest that a five-level scale could be deployed, or else a four-level scale that misses the neutral point (in order to force a rating decision) using low, medium-low, medium-high and high rating values. Either a four- or five-level scale would be useful.
This provides an extensive and comprehensive typology of characteristics of RBP forms, and provides a basis for assessing how the factors can be represented in the model in Figure 1 to provide a fairly sophisticated visualization of how the RBP form may fit into the accepted categories of RBP.
Developing the framework leads to a significant “so what?” question—how can this model and framework be used? We answer that by suggesting that each procurement choice will require supporting mechanisms. The key to designing an effective procurement approach is to understand what platform foundational facilities and behavioral drivers are required and how to configure the processes, routines, and means that will drive practice towards the desired outcome. Figure 1 assists this in that it provides a visualization of what is required of the procurement choice. The framework in Appendix 1 Tables 3, 4, and 5 provides more detailed explanation of the Figure 1 elements to describe sub-elements and the means to assess and measure the level of the element between low and high. This helps us to visualize what each procurement form presented in Table 1 may look like and from that guides the appropriate level of platform facilities, behaviors, and means to achieve the project delivery goals and aims. Visualization can lead to an appreciation of what is required for a specific RBP type, for example that illustrated in Figure 2, below or across RBP forms as illustrated in Appendix 1 Table 6.
Figure 2: Visualization of project partnering based on the model’s 16 elements.
We experimented with this mapping approach and illustrated our results in Figure 2 for a specific RBP type and in Appendix 1 Table 6 to map all RBP forms by level of intensity of collaboration between the pO and the project design and delivery team. The four orders of collaboration in Appendix 1 Table 6 provide one dimension to scale a comparison across all RBP forms that can present the 16 elements through the lens of the degree of collaboration between the PO/POR and the other project team members. Explanation of those four orders and how they were developed is beyond the scope of this paper and is presented elsewhere (Walker & Lloyd-Walker, 2013; Walker & Lloyd-Walker, 2014b). Intensity of collaboration against procurement form can then be mapped as illustrated in Appendix 1 Table 1, and the platform, behavior, and process elements can be used to suggest an appropriately labeled RBP approach, as well as to aid in configuring procurement arrangement features and requirements. For example, a high level of motivation and context for collaboration would suggest that an alliance is appropriate, whereas for a D&C approach, medium motivation and context levels would be appropriate. This evaluation can be used to justify, benchmark, or assess the use of an alliance or D&C for a specific context that is linked to the Appendix 1 Table 1 measures. We used the transcript data from our 50 interviewees to develop the measures for each element in the model (Figure 1). While we recognize that this was a large sample of interviewees and we did appear to reach data saturation, we cannot be sure, and indeed we suspect that this model and framework may be culture-specific for a situation where a knowledgeable and sophisticated client and project delivery team members are involved in the project development. We suspect that the necessary knowledge, skills, attributes, and experience (KSAE) that are required to fully participate in high-level collaborative RBP forms will be lacking in situations where the client or project design/delivery team is not sufficiently able to understand how to effectively configure the elements in the model in Figure 1 to design an appropriate procurement form. This begs the question: What KSAE are required and how are they measured? The answer to this question is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is addressed elsewhere (Walker & Lloyd-Walker, 2014b).
In this paper we have been constrained in providing a detailed discussion about the depth and level of theory that informed our model; for this, readers should refer to Collaborative Project Procurement Arrangements (Walker & Lloyd-Walker, 2014b), available from the PMI Knowledge Center. Likewise, that book also provides greater detail on a range of associated matters, including how the various RBP terms evolved and the areas of the world where they are to be seen practiced.
The model and framework allow us to categorize any project form using the 16 elements to approximate a general understanding of how it may be described, and to detail the expectations of governance, behaviors, and processes that may be adopted. This is useful in both clarifying expectations and in developing a theory of project procurement choice making. To illustrate how it may be used, we included in Appendix 1 an illustration from the (Walker & Lloyd-Walker, 2014b) book of an assessment of RBP forms that were generally in use within Europe, North America, and Australasia at the time of writing. The utility of such an illustration would be the possibility of a clearer understanding of expectations based upon elements and sub-elements that may be included in the figure.
This paper is limited to being a summary of only one part of the book (Walker & Lloyd-Walker, 2014b), and so inevitability its impact is limited. We argue, however, that it delivers on its purpose to provide an indication of how RBP can be more systematically understood and categorized. The advantage of the model and framework is that it does not rigidly fix procurement forms in space and time, but rather it allows for more accurate interpretation and accommodates evolution in these categorical forms. This is because the most important aspect of the categories is not the nomenclature but rather the description of their characteristics and element/sub-element composition. This framework is presented as a proposed model/framework. We would expect others to explore and challenge the elements and sub-elements in light of additional future empirical studies. Practitioners and their organizations may take the framework and model as a baseline to adapt and use in pragmatic ways that we have not yet envisaged. In this way, we expect that the work will make both a project management theoretical and practice contribution.
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Table 3: Wittgenstein’s family resemblance elements for platform foundational facilities for RBP.
|Platform Foundational Facilities: Elements and Themes 1–5||Sub-Themes From the Transcript Analysis||Suggested to be Measured by a Five-Point Likert Scale|
1 The motivation and context of the circumstances impacting a procurement choice.
This defines a substrate of circumstances that affects the potential degree of possible collaboration.
|Best value—motivational focus is on value not lowest cost. Value is expressed in KRAs and KPIs that are linked to the project purpose. Often 3BL issues are of high priority in such cases. |
Emergency recovery—motivation drives a procurement solution that enables recovery from the emergency as quickly and as feasibly as possible.
Experimental—motivation drives purposeful exploration of options and the ability to learn and reflect upon experience to accumulate valuable knowledge that advances project objectives.
Competitive resource availability environment—motivation drives a sustainable response to the prevailing competitive environment. Economically buoyant times pose a challenge to POs losing key staff to other employers. In challenging economic times POs could be obliged by their governments to take advantage of their market position to force project delivery teams to accept contract conditions that may be in the PO’s short-term but not long-term interests. Both conditions impose pressures related to economic times.
Relational rationale—motivation and context drives the underlying logic of forming and developing relationships with potential project team members to further a longer-term interest. Often all parties can benefit from the relationship, perhaps due to high levels of turbulence and change that challenge a BAU approach.
Known risks—motivation can be triggered by the PO/POR assessing that a particular procurement form appears most appropriate to respond to risk sharing and responsibility that are known, assessable, and best managed by the relevant identified participant to be allocated responsibility for those risks.
Unknown risks—motivation is rooted in a context in which uncertainty requires a response of nurturing deep collaboration and trust between parties within a no-blame environment. There is a need for a psychologically safe environment where all participants can experiment with new approaches to respond to uncertainly and extreme ambiguity using teams with the capacity to rapidly evaluate consequences and outcomes and respond accordingly.
|Low levels would be related to a hostile environment for collaboration. This may be due to lack of conviction of project participants in the value of collaboration within this project’s context. |
High levels would relate to the procurement choice solution being driven by the acceptance of project participants in the logic of a clear advantage being gained by adopting a focus on a supportive and collaborative approach to delivering benefits that align with the values of participants.
2. The level of joint governance structure. Having a unified way that each project delivery team party legitimizes its actions through rules, standards and norms, values, and coordination mechanisms such as organizational routines, and the way that committees, liaison, and hierarchy represent a unified or complimentary way of interacting.
This impacts the quality of explicit understanding of how teams should collaborate and communicate.
|Governance processes—common assumptions and ways of working influence project governance processes and rules. These will vary according to the project procurement delivery form but will be designed to align the strategy, objectives, and aims of the project. Process clarity is essential to inform the required behaviors. |
Governance structure—the structure of the entire project team defines how the level of flexibility/rigidity, power and influence, and communication symmetry directly influences the workplace culture. The way that a project’s overall leadership and management team is constituted impacts who has a voice and how they can express ideas, perspectives, and concerns.
Governance best value strategy through KRAs and KPIs—the project output and outcome is influenced by the strategy deployed to define, measure, and assess success. The way that these are developed and used impacts effective project governance.
|Low levels would be related to a laissez-faire approach where each participating project team has established its own individual stand-alone project governance standards. Little coherence in alignment of the whole project delivery organizational processes and structure is evident with few explicit expectations about what success looks like and how to define and measure it. |
High relates to an effectively structured, uniform, integrated, and consistent set of performance standards that apply across and within the project delivery teams. All participant organizations share a common understanding of how to organize for success and what constitutes valuable project output and outcome success.
3. The extent to which an integrated risk mitigation strategy is organized for all parties as part of the client’s proactive risk management system.
This has an impact on the quality of explicit understanding of how to collaboratively manage risk and uncertainty and potentially gain advantage from a project-wide insurance policy.
|Risk sharing conversation—The conversation about risk sharing: who takes responsibility for any class of or particular risk. The strategy needs to be coherent to ensure that those best able to manage risk do so in a way that aligns the risk strategy to the project objectives and aims. The nature of these conversations differs in emphasis placed upon means to allocate accountability across project procurement forms. |
Risk mitigation actions—there are a number of ways, ranging from collective to individual, to agree upon and decide how to mitigate risk that vary according to the procurement form.
System integration—of the project is structured and managed to provide a platform that is based upon the participant’s philosophical stance about relationships between teams. Systems can be integrated to cope with risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity to respond to a need for a platform to be developed to address these three related but separate concepts.
|Low levels would be characterized by an immature and confused individual firm-specific risk management approach and poorly defined systemic approaches to deal with uncertainty and ambiguity. |
High levels would be represented by consistent and integrated risk assessment processes being identified, assessed, and mitigated against a project-wide and broader systems-wide impact for the project or network in the case of programs of projects.
4. The level of joint communication strategy platforms such as integrated processes and Information Communication Technology (ICT) groupware including building information modeling (BIM) and other electronic forms of communication.
While BIM is more prevalent in recent years, past equivalent forms include groupware ICT, sharing drawings and plans between teams. Joint communication facilitates common communication and understanding.
|Common processes and systems—Project participants need to share a common way of working and a common language and communication approach to avoid misunderstandings that can undermine trust and commitment and consequently undermine effective decision making and action. Bridges and interoperability between systems to cope with a lack of a “one system” is also essential. |
Integrated communication platform—A common ICT platform, including, for example, common building information modeling (BIM) tools, can minimize the risk of poor coordination and communication and misunderstandings between participants
|Low levels of joint communication would be characterized by poor-quality staff interaction, use of firm-specific rather than project-wide processes and ICT systems, and weak cross-team mechanisms for gaining mutual understanding. |
High levels would be characterized by well-integrated processes that are well understood by all participants and advanced communication technologies being used that seamlessly connect all project parties within a particular procurement arrangement.
5. The extent that project teams are substantially co-located within easy physical reach of each other.
Close proximity facilitates ad hoc and chance encounters to improve building relationships and facilitating common understanding.
|Hierarchal integration mechanisms—Leaders can inspire motivation towards unity of purpose by physically interacting with individuals in the various levels of an organization. Site visits, meetings held on site, and other ritualistic or practical events that are held in the actual workplace can be very important as a platform for integrated joint action. |
Physical co-location—Project participants can more easily communicate and interact on problem solving, monitoring, and active collaboration when they are in within easy reach of each other. Co-location in a well-considered and conducive environment can facilitate positive interaction.
|Low levels would be characterized by firm-specific policy determining that disparate teams are physically located in dispersed locations. There may also be a large visibility gap between project leaders and those at the “coal face.” |
High levels would be characterized by a project-wide policy that attempts to maximize participant co-location on-site where feasible including the POR. There would also be high interaction between project leadership groups and the project management and physical delivery team members so that engagement enhances communication and mutual perspective taking.
Table 4: Wittgenstein’s family resemblance elements for behavioral factors for RBP.
|Behavioral Factors Driving Normative Practices: Elements and Themes 6-10||Sub-Themes From the Transcript Analysis||Suggested to be Measured by a Five-Point Likert Scale|
6. The degree of authentic leadership, that is, possessing ethical principled values and consistency of action with espoused rhetoric.
This would apply across the project delivery team at every level of team leadership not only for the project lead person(s) but also the supporting design and supply chain team leaders. It speaks to the project culture.
|Authentic leadership is present in designated project leaders who hold institutional or organizational power, but it also applies to “followers” within a collective leadership sense. |
Reflectiveness— Project participants are systems thinkers and often follow a strategic thinking approach to the situational context and know that the situational context is crucial to effective decision making.
Pragmatism—Project participants get on with the job, are politically astute, and work within constraints or find ethical and sensible ways around these constraints.
Appreciativeness—Project participants understanding the motivations and value proposition of influential stakeholders involved in the project. They are consciously engaged with their team members and exhibit signs of having high emotional intelligence.
Resilience—Project participants exhibit adaptability, versatility, flexibility, and persistence when faced with adversity. They are able to effectively learn from experience.
Wisdom—Project participants have opinions and advice that is valued, consistent, and reliable that others instinctively refer to. Their judgment abilities make their brokering advice crucial. They are perceived as having high levels of integrity based on inner strength of character, knowledge, and experience.
Spirit—Project participants demonstrate the courage and have sufficient influence and respect to effectively challenge assumptions and often offer radical alternative solutions to resolve complex and difficult situations.
Authenticity—Project participants demonstrate qualities of being approachable and trustworthy and open to ideas. They encourage and advance collaboration, discussion, and new ways of thinking.
|Low levels are revealed when espoused principled values are not demonstrated in action manifested through a gap between the rhetoric and reality of leading teams. |
High levels demonstrate consistency in espoused and enacted values that are genuinely principled.
7. The trust-control balance of representing and protecting the interests of project leaders with that of other genuinely relevant stakeholders while relying on the integrity, benevolence, and ability of all project team parties to “do the right thing” in terms of project performance.
It is the ability to be able to understand the value proposition of “the other” project teams and to assess their capacity to deliver the promise while establishing mechanisms to ensure transparent accountability.
Trust balance is also about trust in others to suggest improvement and to discuss sensitive (possibly political) issues.
|Autonomy—Project participants have autonomy to respond to the situational context. Their responsiveness is complicated by institutional and cultural norms that may either restrain their autonomy and therefore their capacity to respond to new initiatives and changes to “plan,” or the organizational culture and governance arrangements may leave them with enough autonomy to act somewhat independently. |
Forms of trust—Project participants’ capacity to experiment, explore options, and take action is advanced or constrained by their leadership teams’ perceptions of how various interests are best served. These perceptions are influenced by the nature of that interest, the forms and basis of project participants’ and their leaders’ level of trust in each other, and understanding the impact of assumptions about self-interest and shared interest on trust their levels.
Safe workplace cultures—Project participants’ trust in their leaders and colleagues is often mediated by their perceived treatment in terms of working in a safe psychological, physical, and intellectual environment.
Trust relationship building—Project participants and their leadership teams engage in varying levels of effort to create a balance in trust and control in which trust with caution is tempered with blind faith.
|Low balance is demonstrated by extreme naivety by participants about trusting others implicitly or alternatively by exhibiting high levels of suspicion and/or unreasonable demands for formal and informal control and monitoring that implies a cynical attitude towards trust of others. |
High balance is demonstrated by innate sensibility to juggle transparency and accountability demands with the need for trust with necessary due diligence. It also demonstrates a professional understanding of the nature of project participant accountability constraints and opportunities for resolving and possible helping to resolve institutional paradoxes so that accountability is consistent with accepted responsibility.
8. Commitment to be innovative
represents the duality of being willing to be innovative within a structured mechanism to enable and empower people to be innovative.
This is closely linked to a project team participants’ capacity for learning, reflection, creativity, being ambidextrous, and the organization’s core values of supporting and rewarding questioning the status quo.
|Innovation types—Project participants need to understand and adapt to behavioral expectations associated with different types of project procurement form. They may be engaged in product, process, or behavioral types of innovation within a project or program situational context that could affect how team members’ commitment can be initiated and sustained. Balancing exploration and exploitation of innovation, given the procurement form expectation, is important. |
Commitment to continuous improvement—Project participants’ purpose for being innovative should be to achieve continuous improvement. The extent to which project participants can be innovative and effect continuous improvement depends upon institutional, governance, and individual motivational and enabling factors.
Testing, prototyping and experimenting—Project participants’ innovative actions are usually manifested by testing, prototyping, and experimentation within the context of having an inquiring, curious, and often skeptical mind.
|Low commitment levels are manifested by inadequate or incomplete linkage of motivation, ability and facilitation for innovation within the context of the procurement form. |
High commitment levels are manifested by vision, objectives, and desire to be innovative with well-considered instruments to measure and demonstrate innovation, motivation through rewards and incentives and demonstrated high levels of existing absorptive capacity for innovation.
9. Common best-for-project mindset and culture relates to the focus being placed on value generated in delivering the project compared with objectives of delivering what was explicitly requested or demanded.
It is also about the priority of the project outcome taking precedence above all other considerations (despite inherent paradoxes). A major effort is directed at a positive and successful project outcome rather than individual teams being winners or losers.
|Alignment of common goals—Project participants need to be effectively collaborating to a constructive end through sharing common and aligned goals about best-for-project outcomes and how that delivers value for money (VfM). |
Outcomes and performance levels—These should be assessed and judged based upon common best-for-project aligned goals.
Challenging for excellence—Project participants need to be constantly challenging their level of outcome and performance through effective collaboration towards a constructive evaluation of achieved outcomes and performance.
Value for money reporting—Project participants need to devise ways to recognize, monitor, and effectively diffuse knowledge about how their performance and workplace culture has impacted VfM on their project or program. This is not about “spin-doctoring” but about making a credible and acceptable case for recognizing achievements.
Recruiting support—Project participants need to devise ways to effectively recruit support for best-for-project values through an effective PO/POR internal and NOPs recruitment strategy, as well as enlisting support for as many members of the project delivery chain as is possible.
|Low best-for-project mindset levels are manifested by a higher level of priority for individual benefit realization at the potential expense of other project team members and the project owner. |
High best-for-project mindset levels are manifested by a genuine attitude that “we all sink or swim together” and a focus on maximizing value to the project (or network in the case of a program). Contractual arrangements will reinforce pooled gain or pain based on performance measured by KRAs and KpIs.
10. No-blame culture relates to the degree to which teams welcome taking responsible accountability for problems as they arise rather than having shirked responsibility in the hope that others take them on who may be vulnerable to being blamed for potential failure.
It is also about being “part of the solution” through being part of an overall acceptance of shared-and-several responsibility for understanding. This involves discussing problems in an unprejudiced manner, opening up one’s mind to alternative perspectives, and seeing issues from multiple perspectives.
|Rationale for a no-blame culture—Project participants avoiding a blame-shifting culture having felt pain and hardship through past experience of being blamed. They are determined not to repeat the experience and thus support a no-blame culture. |
Facilitating mechanisms for no-blame—contractual, behavioral, and organizational mechanisms that support the establishment and maintenance of a no-blame culture.
|Low no-blame culture is manifested by a project participant’s high propensity to shift blame from themselves to others. These problems may be attributable to them for unforeseen, unanticipated, or unwanted events that adversely impact project delivery. A low no-blame culture is also palpable by a tendency to avoid acknowledging potential problem situations in the hope that blame can be attributed to others. |
High no-blame culture is manifested by a culture of open discussion of problems and unforeseen, unanticipated, or unwanted events that may adversely impact project delivery. The purpose of a no-blame culture is to achieve wider team participation in collaboration and collective management of problems and to take responsibility and accountability for developing problem solutions. It may also be manifested by the PO taking ownership of risk elements that other participants are unable to bear rather than force them to accept accountability for such risks.
Table 5: Wittgenstein’s family resemblance elements for processes, routines, and means for RBP.
|Processes, Routines, and Means Driving Normative Practices: Elements and Themes 11-16||Sub-Themes From the Transcript Analysis||Suggested to be Measured by a Five-Point Likert Scale|
11. Consensus decision making refers to the extent to which there is total agreement on a decision made at the project strategic and project operational executive level.
High levels may require extensive time for discussion, exploration, and testing mental models, and this may be against the interest of speedy decisions and action to counter crises.
Following Langley et al.’s.
(1995) consensus decision making view, this may involve purposefully leaving the means vague while keeping the aims crystal clear and agreeing to navigate solutions by agreeing on end states rather than developing detailed plans.
|Cultural drivers—the discussion in Chapter 4 (Walker & Lloyd-Walker, 2014b) on culture highlighted that some cultures have high power asymmetry where it is expected that individuals at higher levels of a hierarchy make decisions and issue orders to those lower in the hierarchy who must accept and action those decisions. Other cultural dimensions also impact power asymmetry. Uncertainty avoidance leads people to avoid being committed to a risky decision and a collectivist culture encourages, if not requires, that individuals “go along with the crowd” rather than voice concern or opposition to mooted decisions. Some disciplines and workplace settings demand challenges to assumptions, while others demand obedience and discipline. These cultural drivers enhance or impede genuine consensus decision making. |
Enablers of consensus—organizational, structural, as well as behavioral enablers that facilitate and support consensus decision making and action taking.
Inhibitors of consensus—organizational, structural as well as behavioral enablers that inhibit and suppress consensus decision making and action taking.
|Low consensus decision making is manifested by a highly hierarchical project team leaders’ leadership style where power and influence determines how decisions are made and where the expected response is that decisions are implemented without question or complaint. It is also manifested by a tendency for a domination of top-down directives being issued as edicts. |
High consensus decision making is manifested by a highly egalitarian and collaborative leadership style of project team leaders. Issues and problems requiring a decision develop out of inclusive knowledge sharing and discussion of perspectives, expected intended and unintended consequences, and implications of decisions. High levels of feedback, good or bad, are sought.
12. Focus on learning and continuous improvement refers to providing a compelling projects-as-learning value proposition and the practice of transforming learning opportunities into continuous improvement.
It also implies that emphasis on learning KrAs and KPIs should not only be focused on documenting and publicizing lessons learned from projects but that project teams should value these KRAs and KPIs to be highly ranked as important project management and project outcome success factors.
|Lessons-learned knowledge transfer—participants should be aware of the mechanisms that projects offer for opportunities for learning. They should be aware of the PO’s learning and continuous improvement preferences and needs, how other team members operate, and how to best collaborate with them to learn from the project and to gain technical, process, or interpersonal knowledge. Some projects are specifically established as learning laboratories for radical new innovation or for more methodical incremental improvement. A focus on effective lessons-learned knowledge transfer needs to be designed into a procurement form to avoid lessons learned becoming lessons forgotten or ignored. |
Capacity to adapt to new ideas—participants need to facilitate continuous improvement by prompting learning-oriented ways of thinking and doing. Knowledge transfer, as discussed in Chapter 4 Table 4 (Walker & Lloyd-Walker, 2014b), is difficult because knowledge is sticky. People who can make the most from continuous improvement are open to the process of “unlearning” and “relearning.” Without this adaptive capacity, lessons learned become lessons ignored, and often context is not considered to wisely consider which lessons should be adopted or adapted depending on the way that the new context emerges.
A culture of skills and learning development—participants need to be developing a culture of organizational and individual learning to facilitate lessons-learned knowledge transfer and provide the environment in which this can effectively take place. This goes beyond training and development at the technical and process levels. It also entails enabling participants to perceive and understand context and situation and interconnectedness of elements into a whole so that cause and effect links can be understood to enable intelligent adaptation of lessons learned.
|Low focus on learning and continuous improvement is manifested by actors within collaborative arrangements and a network delivering a project being blind to and failing to grasp the potential competitive advantage of applying presented learning opportunities. |
High focus on learning and continuous improvement is manifested by actors within collaborative arrangements and a network delivering a project being alert and aware of opportunities for improvement and being successful in grasping competitive advantage through effectively harvesting lessons learned.
13. Incentive arrangements refer to the painsharing and gainsharing agreement. This refers to how the process was instigated and how it operated. Shared accountability and a desire for innovation require a risk and reward mechanism to create an incentive to excel.
At one extreme, all profit margins may be quarantined and pooled and subsequently distributed based on a negotiated and agreed pain and gain sharing formula based on total project performance. Alternatively, profit margins may be based solely on individual team performance.
|Incentive arrangements—Project participants are incentivized to perform at exceptional levels of performance, and there is a risk/reward system in place to encourage this. Central to incentive arrangements is developing systematic encouragement for innovation and for benefits of that innovation to be transferred to project participants and then on to their base organizations. Clear KRAs and KPIs are developed to monitor and measure performance. |
Managing tension between innovation and incentivization— participants and project owners need to manage the tension between continuous improvements that keeps raising the performance benchmark and how that is incentivized. It is important to balance providing sufficient incentive and reward for improvement while avoiding incentive targets being either too easy or too hard, as this may undermine continuous improvement. This also brings in issues about balancing innovation incentivized through a competitive dialogue approach at the front end of a project before contracts are let with achieving innovation and improvement by encouraging innovation and continuous improvement progressively throughout the project duration.
|Low levels of incentivization are manifested by little emphasis being placed on encouraging parties to agree to place potential profit and gain/pain in a risk/reward arrangement subject to a whole-of-project outcome performance. KRAs and KPIs are absent or rudimentary. |
High levels of incentivization are manifested by much emphasis being placed on encouraging parties to agree to place potential profit and gain/pain in a risk/reward arrangement that is subject to a whole-of-project outcome performance. KRAs and KPIs are well developed, provide stretch and challenge, and are sophisticated in their understanding of the project context.
14. Pragmatic learning-in-action refers to the active gathering of value through teams collaborating with the strategic aim to learn and to gain competitive advantage through collective opportunities to learn and adapt.
It is about team leaders and members seeing the project as a learning experience with acceptance that both experimental success and failure require discussion and analysis. Often unexpected opportunities arise out of failed experiments through assumptions being reframed that lead to promising benefits in other contexts.
|Action-learning—participants as individuals, but more so in groups, undertake action-learning in a number of ways. These range from simply trying out things and experimenting to undertaking complicated modeling and simulation exercises. These activities provide the mechanisms to gain knowledge from action. It remains critical that mechanisms should be in place to capture and make usable experience and knowledge gained from action-learning initiatives. |
Coaching and mentoring—another form of pragmatic learning is through coaching and mentoring. This is where experience and insights are shared in a formalized manner through one-on-one interaction between project participants and “wiser” or at least more experienced people who can help their coachees/mentees to be able to contextualize learning, to refine it through dialogue, and to add value through that knowledge by sharing stories, making critical comparisons, and exploring meaning and making sense out of that learning.
|Low pragmatic learning-in-action is manifested by actors within a network delivering a project to fail to translate learning opportunities into actual benefits and competitive action. Failed experiments are punished. |
High pragmatic learning-in-action is manifested by actors within a network delivering a project capitalizing on learning opportunities to achieve competitive action. This can be also assessed by the weight that these actors place on the value of experimentation as a way to see issues and solutions in a new light. Failed experiments are valued for their intellectual stimulation in discovering, for example, a better understanding of cause-effect loops.
15. Transparency and open-book processes, routines, and practices refer to project participants agreeing to be audited and fully open to scrutiny.
Actors within the project network would have confidence that they can trust those inspecting their books not to take advantage of that access and information, and those people doing the audits, due diligence, and inspections must be capable and effective enough to understand the implication of what they inspect. Total transparency and accountability is necessary where the project is undertaken on a cost-plus basis where the project owner is funding all direct, administrative and management costs.
The extent of transparency and accountability is a trade-off between the extent to which the PO plays a “hands-on” or “hands-off” role. There is a fine balance needed between expenditure on direct administrative and management costs and how processes reinforce a trust-but-verify approach.
|Transparency—the extent to which project participants agree to be fully open about their cost structures, decision making process, and project delivery processes. |
Accountability—the extent to which project participants agree to be fully open to scrutiny allowing authorized project owner representatives to audit and inspect books, processes, and decision making rationale.
|Low transparency and open-book approaches to project delivery intensely protect the security of organizations and individuals to gain access to information about cost structures or the basis of project plans. It is often exemplified by the code words commercial in confidence.” It seeks to hide both good and bad news, but this often results in mistrust that undermines collaboration and opportunities for constructive change. |
High transparency and open-book approaches to project delivery present opportunities for generating trust by clients and other parties that may access that information. It is a confronting notion that many organizations cannot face. It requires the project owner’s authorized probity auditors to have free access to their financial books. Thus, confidence in ethical and legal business conduct is necessary to accept this challenge.
16. Mutual dependence and accountability refers to collaboration in projects requiring participants to not only recognize their interdependency but also to honestly respond to a sink-or-swim-together workplace culture when communicating.
Governance systems may both support and enhance individual team responsibility and accountability, or alternatively they may inhibit approaches to cross-team collaboration.
|Characteristics of mutual dependency—various forms of RBP have specific unique characteristics that have a focus on mutual team dependency where they “sink or swim together.” Teams may or may not perceive themselves to become a temporary single team entity with perceptions about how participants perceive the workplace supports or inhibits a unified team approach to managing the project. |
Enhancing enablers of mutual dependency—participants seek to actively leverage processes, routines, and means to facilitate and sustain collaboration.
Countering inhibitors to mutual dependency— participants seek to actively counter processes, routines, and means that inhibit and undermine collaboration.
|Low mutual dependence and accountability refers to an inability or lack of desire to acknowledge the potential value of team inter-dependence and accountability. Participants follow individualistic paths, possibly at the expense of others, and/or do not support a sink-or-skim-together workplace culture or they actively undermine that culture. |
High mutual dependence and accountability refers to an ability and keen desire to acknowledge team interdependence and accountability in ways that builds interteam trust and commitment through actively enhancing a sink-or-swim together workplace culture and to actively counter any actions that may inhibit this culture.
Table 6: RBP forms mapped to the RBP taxonomy model element characteristic measures.
Dr. Derek Walker is Professor of Project Management and Director of Research at the School of Property, Construction and Project Management, RMIT University. He worked in various project management roles in the UK, Canada, and Australia for 16 years before commencing his academic career in 1986. He obtained a Master of Science degree from the University of Aston (Birmingham) in 1978, and a PhD in 1995 from RMIT University (Melbourne). He has written over 200 peer-reviewed papers and book chapters.
Dr. Beverley Lloyd-Walker is a senior lecturer in management and course director of the Master of Business (Management) in the College of Business, Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia. After several years working in the industry, she commenced her career in academia in 1990. She obtained her PhD from Monash University (Melbourne) in 1999. She has published over 37 refereed papers and ten refereed chapters, and co-authored three editions of the book Human Resource Management in Australia. Her current major area of research relates to people in temporary organizations, in particular career development and planning for project managers.
©2014 Project Management Institute Research and Education Conference