As the busiest inland commercial shipping route in the United States, the Ohio River is a valuable link in the country's economy.
More than 80 million tons of grain, coal and other commodities pass through each year—together worth more than US$22 billion. So when antiquated locks and dams at one juncture began causing serious transit delays decades ago, the U.S. government knew it had to fix the bottleneck as quickly as possible.
But the Olmsted Locks and Dam replacement project on the state border between Illinois and Kentucky proved anything but easy. The marathon megaproject, launched in 1988, encountered obstacles at every turn—spanning six U.S. presidents and tripling its original budget before finally being completed last year. Yet as the largest civil works project in the history of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, a PMI Global Executive Council member, the 30-year, US$3.1 billion initiative is being heralded a success by the government.
Faced with possible shutdown, the project team continuously adapted its plan and, by 2012, began to steer construction of two locks and a five-gate dam back on course. While racking up 45 million construction work hours, the team made strategic shifts and closely collaborated with contractor AECOM to ultimately create ways to save time and money—and earn praise from elected officials and other key sponsors.
“We became a more resilient organization by having a bit of a chip on our shoulder and knowing the relevance of our project to the nation,” says Michael Braden, PMP, former Olmsted division chief, chief of design branch, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Louisville, Kentucky, USA. “Setting clear, definable objectives and subsequently achieving them created a culture where we challenged our best each and every day.”
—Michael Braden, PMP, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Louisville, Kentucky, USA
Construction on the Ohio River's Olmsted Locks and Dam in 2013
OBSTACLE COURSE
The project team had to go against the current from the start. Congress attached strings to the original US$775 million budget: Rather than one lump-sum appropriation, lawmakers would approve it in annual increments, per civil works projects requirements. As a result, timing of the actual funding was at the mercy of the legislative schedule, meaning each year's funds were sometimes delayed by several months, Mr. Braden says. Congress also required the team to forecast its spending two years in advance, which made it difficult to generate accurate estimates, he says.
“Given the timing uncertainty and the likely scope adjustments in the interim, it's very difficult to plan that allotment fully while meeting the enterprise performance metric,” he says.
But funding was just one indefinite variable. Construction could take place only when the river's water level was low. But with the water rising and falling by 50 feet (15 meters) each year, the low-and high-water seasons couldn't be predicted with complete certainty. “The team had to align the construction of a massive infrastructure project with an annual-appropriation funding stream while in a very difficult marine environment,” Mr. Braden says.
Workers set an abutment and shell during dam construction.
For instance, in the mid-1990s, the team constructed a US$70 million cofferdam, a temporary structure that created a large area of dry riverbed to build the locks. In 1997, the cofferdam flooded, causing a three-month delay and driving up costs. Two years earlier, the team had not scheduled or budgeted for this unexpected setback.
“We couldn't align the funding we'd programmed two years earlier with the reality of the site today,” Mr. Braden says.
—Michael Braden, PMP
Other factors contributed to rising costs. When Hurricane Katrina hit the U.S. Gulf Coast in 2005, many of the country's marine assets, such as barges, were sent to New Orleans, Louisiana to help with rebuilding projects. “Overnight, the price of the dozens of barges we needed to build Olmsted doubled,” Mr. Braden says. At the same time, China experienced a construction boom, leading to higher prices for materials like concrete.
The team had to constantly adapt to change—and work in tandem with sponsors and contractors to generate solutions that were least harmful to the budget and schedule. For example, after the cofferdam flooding, the Corps team compared two construction methods, one of which involved building the dam's components riverside and then precisely placing them into the water. This approach had two key advantages: It would allow river traffic to continue, and it would have less impact on the river's habitat.
The team built the nation's largest super gantry crane to lift precast shells.
PHOTOS COURTESY OF THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
However, the approach had never been attempted on a project of this scale, and it would require building one-of-a-kind equipment, such as a super gantry crane that could lift more than 5,000 tons. Wary of costs they couldn't anticipate, contractors did not bid on the initial firm fixed-price request for proposal. Ultimately they offered bids only when reimbursement of added costs could be assured. In 2004, the Corps team awarded the project to an AECOM-led joint venture. For the next six years, the contractor designed and built the infrastructure and equipment needed to construct the dam. That took longer and cost more than anticipated.
For instance, the team had estimated that the specialized equipment would cost US$30 million. It ended up costing twice that. “That's because much of the one-of-a-kind technology and equipment necessary to facilitate the in-the-wet construction did not exist at the beginning of this endeavor,” says Mickey Awbrey, PMP, Olmsted division deputy chief, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Olmsted, Illinois, USA.
CHANGE OF PLANS
By 2012, the project's authorized budget had more than doubled to US$1.7 billion. Although the locks had been built, the project team found that it would need even more funds to complete dam construction. So, that year, the team completely revamped the project plan. The Corps team proposed a US$3.1 billion budget and a completion date of 2026—and had 50 internal and external experts review the plan before submitting it to the U.S. Congress. The new plan—which included a new funding model—was approved in October 2013.
“We went back to the decision makers and said, ‘This is where we are, and this is what we need to finish it,’” Mr. Braden says.
Getting lawmakers and other key stakeholders to maintain support for yet another revision required meticulous and transparent engagement. The team made its case to government sponsors: Rather than having the team request money year after year, the team sought full funding for the new budget, and it vowed to look for ways to save money throughout construction—with the ultimate goal of coming in under the revised budget. “Instead of tailoring the construction to a fixed-funding stream, tailor the funding to the most efficient construction,” Mr. Braden says.
The team also initiated a rigorous risk management plan so stakeholders understood precisely what the new plan was attempting to achieve—and how the team would mitigate the risks associated with it, Mr. Awbrey says. Internal stakeholders received weekly situational reports and participated in biweekly vertical coordination calls. They also took part in monthly civil works progress review boards and quarterly inland waterway user board briefings. Corps senior leaders received monthly summary reports and attended twiceÖ¾aÖ¾year formal partnering meetings.
A barge carries concrete dispensers.
RECOVERY MODE
The team knew the best way to save money on the new budget was to save time. That meant working closely with the contractor to identify scheduling efficiencies and a smart use of resources. The project's original plan had limited the construction season to a 5.5-month period when the water levels are typically lowest, from June to November. The contractor could try to extend the construction season, but only at its own risk. If the contractor got its crews ready to set the dam's shells a month ahead of the low-water season, it could lose US$50,000 if the water turned out to be too high. The contractor wanted the government to share that risk.
“The contractors wanted buy-in from us that they would look outside the strict terms of the contract if we assumed the risk together,” Mr. Braden says.
Mr. Braden's team came to a conclusion: The potential benefit outweighed the risk. By having the contractor ready to set shells as early as May, the team shaved a full month off the schedule in two separate years. At one point, the team lost the entire month of July because of high water, but that year it had already placed those shells ahead of schedule.
“We mitigated risks and bought float into the schedule by starting early or finishing late to extend the construction season,” Mr. Braden says. “We freed up the contractor to be aggressive and do great things.”
Training also threatened to eat into each year's budget and schedule. It cost time and money to onboard and offboard a temporary annual workforce of 400 to 600 team members. So the team decided to keep a core group of team members on site year-round, and it increased the workday from a single-shift eight-hour schedule to a double-shift 10-hour schedule. The team also solicited input from external experts to identify work that could be completed outside the low-water season to advance the schedule and take advantage of favorable out-of-season river conditions.
“That resulted in critical-path acceleration in addition to consistent year-to-year schedule predictability,” Mr. Awbrey says. For instance, the team determined it could drive the critical master, sheet and foundation piles into the riverbed for the dam's foundation earlier in the season. That helped it get in front of shell-setting activities, he says. The team also increased its subcontractors' yearly production of the dam's 160 wicket gates and five tainter gates, which capture the river pool and control the flow of water. So as the schedule advanced on other project activities, the gates were ready to go when the team needed them.
IN THE FLOW
With so much change and activity, the team needed to forge close collaboration among contractor teams. In 2012, the Corps established a project office that integrated members of all teams, breaking down silos between them. “The Corps initiated its integrated project offices to address projects like Olmsted that are too big and too important to fail,” Mr. Braden says.
Every January, teams from the government and the contractors held joint strategic planning meetings to value-stream critical path production scopes of work, budget for the upcoming year's milestones and identify any stretch goals. They also held meetings on a daily, weekly and monthly basis to determine cost and schedule production plan adherence. “We had constant coordination and seamless integration with the contractors, senior leaders and key production staff to assure yearly milestones were achieved,” Mr. Awbrey says.
—Mickey Awbrey, PMP, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Olmsted, Illinois, USA
The collaborative approach helped increase morale as the project began to linger in 2013 while external stakeholders pushed to shut down the initiative, Mr. Braden says. He turned morale around by targeting specific achievable objectives, such as installing each of the dam's 55 shells. “We focused on building on each success, and each success was intoxicating, so the entire team was quickly onboard,” he says.
The Olmsted Locks and Dam
Key stakeholders in the project's war room
Mr. Braden also lifted spirits by recruiting Corps engineers “who had a project management mindset and wanted to win,” he says. Of the Corps' 28 integrated project office team members, 25 percent had a Project Management Professional (PMP)® certification. “Engineers are great—I'm an engineer—but they can be a bit risk-averse. Project managers are more aggressive.”
—Michael Braden, PMP
THE FINISH LINE
By 2017, the team determined it could safely place the dam's final shell in December—well into the traditional high-water season and a year earlier than the new schedule had planned. As it happened, the water level rose early and stayed high in 2018—too high to set any shells that year. So the team effectively saved not one but two years. “We got the project done before that risk was actualized,” Mr. Braden says. In 2018, the team completed the gates.
By identifying and exploiting efficiencies from 2013 to 2018, the Corps team got the project to the finish line about US$325 million under the revised budget. The dam was operational in 2018, four years ahead of schedule. The team is on track to remove the old dams and locks by 2020, six years ahead of schedule. The project now delivers a net economic benefit of US$640 million a year, meaning it will pay for itself in a matter of years.
“That good-news story happened because we had vertical integration between the people in the field doing the work and the decision makers funding the project,” Mr. Braden says. PM
Revised Route
1988: The U.S. Congress approves the project to replace the Olmsted Locks and Dam.
1993: Project receives initial funding, and the construction phase begins.
1997: Project delayed when a flood fills the cofferdam.
1998: Project's original completion date
2002: Locks are completed.
2004: Team begins the dam's construction infrastructure.
2010: Completion of the dam's construction infrastructure
2012: Team revises the project plan.
2013: U.S. Congress approves the revised plan.
2017: Team places the dam's final shell.
2018: Construction project completed—four years early and US$325 million under budget, compared with the revised plan.
TALENT SPOTLIGHT
Michael Braden, PMP, chief of design branch, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Location: Louisville, Kentucky, USA
Experience: 26 years
Why did this project have special meaning for you?
I started my career on the Olmsted project in 1996, and I always thought about returning to it after I left it in 2002. When I was deployed to Iraq, in 2010 and 2011, I saw that the project wasn't doing well. I realized the best way to return to it was to study for the Project Management Professional (PMP)® exam. So I did. I came back and got the PMP® certification and then got back to the project in 2013, and it's been wonderful ever since.
What career lessons did you learn on this project?
Communicate your objective simply, surround yourself with the best people and create a pattern of success.